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When individuals and firms fail to invest in adequate care, the government 
often steps in, taking costly measures to restore safety or mitigate harm. Under 
such circumstances, a question arises as to whether the government can demand 
recovery for its costs. For many years, the answer has been negative; tort law has 
persistently refused to render negligent individuals and firms liable for govern-
mental expenditures. Yet recently, the law changed markedly. Recognizing that 
the no-liability regime subsidizes faulty behavior, an increasing number of juris-
dictions have established the right of public entities to sue for reimbursement of 
costs. Against this backdrop, this Article shows that the government’s right of 
recovery often has little effect on individuals’ and firms’ incentives to prevent 
harm. More important and disturbing, however, this right distorts governmental 
incentives to provide equal services to all. Particularly, given the right to demand 
compensation for its expenditures, the government will favor the rich at the ex-
pense of the poor. This risk is not theoretical but real and troubling. The Article 
proposes a legal regime that induces individuals and firms to prevent harm op-
timally, while eliminating the government’s incentives to discriminate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fire departments, police forces, rangers, health authorities, 
environmental agencies, and emergency squads are all examples 
of governmental entities that take costly measures to reduce risks 
to individuals, to rescue them or their property when necessary, 
and to provide them with other services essential to their well-
being. The circumstances and risks requiring the provision of 
such personal governmental services (PGS) can be the result of 
the behavior, faulty or not, of third parties or the recipients of the 
services. For example, a fire that endangers someone’s property 
might be the result of wrongdoing by a third party (say, a negli-
gent neighbor), the faulty behavior of the property owner herself, 
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or a nonwrongful cause. Is the governmental entity—the fire de-
partment in this case—that rescues the individual at risk entitled 
to recover its costs from the wrongdoer (if there is one) or, alter-
natively, the negligent rescuee? If a public official—a firefighter 
in our example—is injured in the course of a rescue, is she entitled 
to recover her losses from the wrongdoer or negligent rescuee? 
Traditionally, the answer to both questions has been no. The pro-
vision of PGS following faulty behavior has been considered part 
of the services that citizens—wrongdoers and negligent rescuees 
included—are entitled to receive for free or, more accurately, for 
the taxes that they pay to the government. 
The unwillingness to allow the government to recover for 
PGS is not restricted to rescue operations in the strict sense. Pub-
lic hospitals, which provide healthcare to tort victims, cannot re-
cover their costs from wrongdoers.1 Similarly, costly measures 
taken by governmental entities to prevent harmful events before 
they occur are commonly nonrecoverable. Thus, if the police, mil-
itary, health authorities, or agencies responsible for handling and 
supervising hazardous substances secure citizens’ activities—
even negligent ones—before any harm is done, they are generally 
not entitled to reimbursement of their costs.2 
 In recent years, however, the law has been undergoing a 
transformation. Courts have substantially limited the rules that 
restrict the recovery rights of governmental entities and public 
officials. Similarly, more and more jurisdictions are enacting stat-
utes allowing governmental entities and their employees to re-
cover their costs from either wrongdoers or negligent rescuees 
who are responsible for the events that triggered the need for 
PGS. The common argument supporting this new trend is that 
 
 1 See, for example, Daughters of Charity Health Services of Waco v Linnstaedter, 
226 SW3d 409, 411 (Tex 2007) (noting that a “hospital has neither tort nor contract rights 
against a tortfeasor who has injured a patient”). For further discussion regarding the abil-
ity of hospitals to secure recovery for the costs of treating victims and, in particular, their 
ability to place a lien on recoveries patients may receive from third parties that caused the 
patients’ injuries, see text accompanying notes 94–97. See also Midwest Neurosurgery, 
P.C. v State Farm Insurance Co, 686 NW2d 572, 578 (Neb 2004) (“Without the lien statute, 
the provider would be limited to bringing an action against the patient to recover the 
debt.”) (emphasis added). 
 2 See, for example, City of Bridgeton v B.P. Oil, Inc, 369 A2d 49, 54–55 (NJ 1976) 
(holding that a city could not recover the costs it incurred while taking measures to pre-
vent possible harms following an oil spill). But see Camden County Board of Chosen Free-
holders v Beretta U.S.A. Corp, 123 F Supp 2d 245, 261 n 10 (D NJ 2000) (noting that the 
New Jersey legislature’s decision to repeal the “fireman’s rule” by statute “may signify a 
willingness to depart from the common law rule with respect to personal injuries caused 
to governmental personnel due to the negligent or intentional torts of others”). See also 
Parts I.A–B. 
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such liability is essential for optimal deterrence.3 The reasoning 
is that a wrongdoer or a potential rescuee who bears no liability 
for the costs of PGS has insufficient incentives to take precautions 
in the first place, knowing that the costs of eliminating risks or 
ameliorating the harm if something goes wrong will be borne by 
others. 
This Article makes three claims about the scope of and justi-
fication for imposing liability on negligent beneficiaries of PGS. It 
claims first that ideally, and as opposed to what is commonly  
assumed, a negligent beneficiary of PGS (whether a third party 
or rescuee) should bear liability not just for the immediate costs 
of providing the services but for the entire social harm caused by 
her faulty behavior,4 which is typically much greater than the 
costs to the PGS provider. In many cases, this social harm in-
cludes harms to third parties who were deprived of critical PGS 
or received inferior PGS because of the beneficiary’s failure to 
take care. 
To illustrate the Article’s first claim, consider an emergency 
case, such as a flood or a severe storm, in which rescue services 
are rendered to many beneficiaries, including those who were 
negligent by failing to take proper care. Given the large number 
of people in need, however, the governmental agency may not  
accommodate all affected individuals. To provide potential bene-
ficiaries with efficient incentives to take care, the negligent ben-
eficiaries should be liable not for the costs they inflicted on the 
governmental agency,5 but rather for the harm borne by the indi-
viduals whom the agency failed to accommodate because of the 
negligent beneficiaries’ insufficient care. In other words, the neg-
ligent beneficiaries occupied rescue forces, which otherwise would 
have been allocated to other individuals, thereby preventing their 
harms. 
 
 3 See, for example, Hanoch Dagan and James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and 
Injurious Industries, 75 NYU L Rev 354, 398 (2000): 
Public authorities should be able to respond in an efficient manner to any threat 
to the public health or safety, without worrying that the provision of services 
would insulate those who are responsible to these threats from liability and un-
justifiably shift the burden of their wrongdoing to the public purse. 
 4 While the recent trend has been to expand the liability of negligent PGS benefi-
ciaries, existing rules do not require nonnegligent beneficiaries to pay (beyond their taxes) 
for such services. See Part I.A. The bulk of the arguments developed in this Article, how-
ever, would also apply if liability were strict, namely, under a regime in which beneficiar-
ies are liable for governmental expenditures irrespective of their fault. 
 5 As we explain, paying the average fixed costs alongside the varying costs would 
not be enough to provide beneficiaries with efficient incentives. See Part II.A.2.d. 
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This liability rule—which we will call ex post internaliza-
tion—could be hard to apply for both practical and legal reasons. 
But we emphasize one important concern, which motivates the 
Article’s second claim: any extensive ex post liability, be it reim-
bursement of costs or ex post internalization, will distort the PGS 
providers’ incentives in providing the services. Specifically, gov-
ernmental entities will be induced to provide more PGS or better 
quality PGS to the rich than what is provided to the poor, since 
the chances of successfully collecting compensation from the for-
mer are greater than from the latter. We show these concerns to 
be not just theoretical but very real and troubling. The perverse 
incentives of PGS providers would not only lead to injustice, but 
also distort the incentives of the rich to take care, even when effi-
ciency requires them to do so. Furthermore, if it is possible for the 
government to know in advance whether the beneficiary of the 
services was negligent, it might prefer to provide more and 
higher-quality services to negligent beneficiaries than to benefi-
ciaries who took adequate care, since compensation can be col-
lected only from the former. Such governmental bias would also 
lead to injustice and inefficiency. The straightforward solution to 
these concerns is to eliminate any ex post liability for PGS. 
To illustrate our second claim, and in particular the concern 
that the poor would be discriminated against by the government, 
consider a fire station that serves two neighborhoods: one rich 
and one poor. With reimbursement of costs imposed on beneficiar-
ies, the fire station would be incentivized to post more fire trucks 
to the rich neighborhood. Its motivation to do so would be not only 
the result of a calculation of the expected harm in each neighbor-
hood,6 but mainly its understanding that collecting compensation 
from the rich would be much easier than from the poor. Apart 
from being unjust, this preference of the fire station to better pro-
tect the rich would undermine the latter’s incentives to take opti-
mal care. In particular, residents of the rich neighborhood might 
refrain from taking care, relying instead on the fire station to as-
sist them when necessary. Indeed, under a reimbursement rule, 
the residents would be required to compensate the fire station. 
However, because this compensation would often be limited in 
scope (for reasons we explain in more detail below7), it would be 
 
 6 Which arguably (although it would be objected to by many) could justify the post-
ing of more trucks to the rich neighborhood, because expected property harm might be 
higher in that neighborhood. 
 7 For an explanation of why implementing full ex post cost internalization would 
not be feasible, see Part II.A.2. 
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cheaper for rich residents to take no precautions even when doing 
so is efficient and reimburse the fire station for its costs when it 
rescues them. We show that the same argument applies to other 
providers of PGS as well. By contrast, the no-liability rule would 
eliminate the incentives of PGS providers to invest excessively in 
protecting the rich, thereby avoiding the troubling consequences 
that follow. 
The no-liability rule, however, is not cost free. As we have 
already pointed out, with no liability, beneficiaries of PGS do not 
internalize many of the costs of their careless behavior, and their 
incentives to take care are deficient. Although this concern is not 
as troubling as the government providing discriminatory services, 
it should not be ignored. This brings us to the Article’s third and 
last claim: both concerns can be mitigated by applying ex ante 
(rather than ex post) liability rules. In particular, ex ante liability 
of negligent beneficiaries would provide them with efficient incen-
tives to take care, and since the government would not expect to 
recover any compensation after providing its services, it would 
have no reason to discriminate against the poor (or against 
nonnegligent beneficiaries). 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents the prevailing 
law on the liability of PGS beneficiaries toward governmental en-
tities and toward officials injured in the course of providing these 
services. It points to the emerging tendency to impose a reim-
bursement duty on PGS beneficiaries and explores the justifica-
tions raised by courts and scholars for and against such a liability 
regime. 
Part II lays out the Article’s two central claims. First, it ar-
gues that making PGS beneficiaries liable for governmental enti-
ties’ costs (reimbursement of costs) does not efficiently incentivize 
them to take optimal care. Rather, to incentivize them to take 
proper care, the government should hold beneficiaries liable for 
the entire harm they caused (ex post internalization). This Part 
then argues that both a reimbursement of costs rule and an 
ex post internalization rule could skew governmental entities’ in-
centives in providing PGS and thereby also distort beneficiaries’ 
incentives to prevent harm. It explores the limits of this argument 
and acknowledges a few exceptions in which either of the two 
rules might work well. 
Part III elaborates on how liability can be designed to  
incentivize not only potential beneficiaries to take optimal care, 
but also governmental entities to provide their services  
nondiscriminatorily. It proposes liability rules—mostly ex ante 
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ones, including mandatory insurance—and suggests how they 
could be applied to some notable categories of PGS. The Article 
concludes with a summary of its arguments and recommenda-
tions, and briefly discusses further applications of the analysis. 
I.  PREVAILING LAW 
Courts have traditionally restricted the liability of PGS ben-
eficiaries for the costs of public services that have been required 
due to their faulty behavior. This has applied to cases in which 
the services were provided following a self-inflicted risk (for ex-
ample, putting out a fire in the beneficiary’s home that was 
caused by his negligence) and to beneficiaries whose negligence 
put others at risk (for example, putting out a fire that spreads to 
a neighbor’s home).8 The conventional legal regime restricting 
beneficiary liability is two pronged. First, unless otherwise explic-
itly authorized in legislation, governmental entities have been 
precluded from claiming compensation for their costs in taking 
measures to eliminate risks or ameliorate harms caused by bene-
ficiaries’ activities. Second, officials who were injured during, or 
in relation to, the provision of such measures usually could not 
recover from those whose faulty behavior led to the injury. These 
limitations on beneficiary liability, however, are being relaxed, 
and PGS beneficiaries are increasingly being sued for compensa-
tion by both governmental entities and individual officials. 
A. Governmental Entities 
In dismissing governmental entities’ claims against PGS ben-
eficiaries, courts have often referred to what is known as the “free 
public services doctrine.”9 Under this common-law doctrine, “the 
 
 8 See, for example, Allenton Volunteer Fire Department v Soo Line Railroad Co, 372 
F Supp 422, 423–24 (ED Wis 1974) (rejecting a fire department’s recovery claim for the 
costs of extinguishing fires involving the defendant’s trains); District of Columbia v Air 
Florida, Inc, 750 F2d 1077, 1080 (DC Cir 1984) (rejecting the District of Columbia’s recov-
ery claim against an allegedly negligent airline for, among other things, the costs of clean-
ing up the wreckage of the defendant’s crashed plane); State v Long Island Lighting Co, 
493 NYS2d 255, 257–58 (NY Cty 1985) (rejecting the state’s recovery claim against the 
utility company for the costs of diverting drivers from the vicinity of the defendant’s fallen 
power lines). 
 9 Timothy D. Lytton, Should Government Be Allowed to Recover the Costs of Public 
Services from Tortfeasors?: Tort Subsidies, the Limits of Loss Spreading, and the Free Pub-
lic Services Doctrine, 76 Tulane L Rev 727, 731–41 (2002). For a comprehensive review of 
cases applying the free public services doctrine and a description of its origins and wide 
application, see David C. McIntyre, Note, Tortfeasor Liability for Disaster Response Costs: 
Accounting for the True Cost of Accidents, 55 Fordham L Rev 1001, 1007–19 (1987). In 
some jurisdictions, the doctrine is termed the “municipal cost recovery rule,” particularly 
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cost of public services . . . is to be borne by the public as a whole, 
not assessed against the tortfeasor whose negligence creates the 
need for the service.”10 The doctrine has been long espoused by 
federal and state courts alike in their jurisprudence.11 Courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, have ruled that in the absence of a 
clear statutory provision allowing for recovery, governmental en-
tities must bear the costs of public services rendered in response 
to wrongdoers’ and negligent rescuees’ behavior.12 Accordingly, 
while negligent tortfeasors have been required to compensate in-
dividual victims for their personal harms, claims filed by states, 
cities, and local municipalities against the same tortfeasors have 
been consistently dismissed. 
Courts have commonly grounded their application of the doc-
trine in the principle that determining fiscal policy is the exclu-
sive authority of the legislature. Because PGS beneficiaries are 
taxpayers, making them liable for public expenditures is a deci-
sion only the legislature can make. The default rule, courts have 
emphasized, is that taxes are the only payments individuals are 
required to make to cover the costs of benefits received from the 
government. Accordingly, if there is no legislation permitting a 
shifting of the costs of public services to wrongdoers and negligent 
rescuees, those costs are to be borne “by the public as a whole.”13 
The no-recovery rule has one exception. Courts have recognized 
 
in the context of claims filed by cities. See Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Construction and Ap-
plication of “Municipal Cost Recovery Rule,” or “Free Public Services Doctrine”, 32 ALR6th 
261, 272–84 (2008) (surveying the application of the doctrine across jurisdictions); Michael 
I. Krauss, Public Services Meet Private Law, 44 San Diego L Rev 1, 6–22 (2007) (showing 
that the doctrine is entrenched in tort law adjudication). 
 10 City of Flagstaff v Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co, 719 F2d 322, 323 
(9th Cir 1983) (denying a claim to recover costs incurred by the city in responding to an 
incident involving derailed tank cars containing a highly flammable substance). 
 11 See McIntyre, Note, 55 Fordham L Rev at 1011–12 (cited in note 9). See also  
Lytton, 76 Tulane L Rev at 740–41 (cited in note 9) (discussing state and federal cases 
applying the doctrine and the historical origins of the doctrine). But see Krauss, 44 San 
Diego L Rev at 32–45 (cited in note 9) (criticizing Lytton’s account and conclusions). 
 12 In United States v Standard Oil Co, 332 US 301, 316–17 (1947), the Supreme 
Court declined to recognize the right of the federal government, in the absence of a statute, 
to recover costs of hospitalizing a soldier injured in a car accident caused by the defend-
ant’s negligent driver. 
 13 Flagstaff, 719 F2d at 323. Justice Wiley Rutledge, writing for the majority in 
Standard Oil, explained that it is Congress, and not the Court, that is “the custodian of 
the national purse” and “the exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs.” Standard Oil, 332 
US at 314. See also Air Florida, 750 F2d at 1080 (“[W]here a generally fair system for 
spreading the costs of accidents is already in effect—as it is here through assessing tax-
payers the expense of emergency services—we do not find the argument for judicial ad-
justment of liabilities to be compelling.”). 
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the right of governmental entities to claim damages when benefi-
ciaries’ activities endangered government-owned property or cre-
ated a public nuisance.14 In such cases, courts have reasoned, the 
governmental entities acting in response to faulty behavior are 
not invoking governmental powers but, rather, are akin to indi-
vidual victims seeking to protect their property. The fiscal argu-
ment therefore does not apply in such cases, and thus governmen-
tal entities can claim compensation for costs incurred as result of 
individuals’ wrongdoing. Yet this exception has been narrowly 
construed, with courts following “[t]he general rule [ ] that public 
expenditures made in the performance of governmental functions 
are not recoverable.”15 
Along with the free public services doctrine, courts have also 
rejected claims by governmental entities for failing to meet cer-
tain standard doctrinal requirements for establishing liability. 
For example, some such claims for recovery have been dismissed 
on the grounds that the defendants-beneficiaries owe no duty  
of care to the government.16 In other cases, the courts have justi-
fied the denial of recovery on the “pure economic loss” doctrine, 
based on the fact that the plaintiff’s harm is limited to economic 
losses.17 Under this doctrine, tort plaintiffs cannot recover for neg-
ligent infliction of monetary losses that are not accompanied by 
physical harm.18 Other courts have grounded their decisions on 
 
 14 See W. Keeton, et al, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 2 at 7 (5th ed 1984) 
(“The state never can sue in tort in its political or governmental capacity, although as the 
owner of property it may resort to the same tort actions as any individual proprietor to 
recover for injuries to the property.”). See also Air Florida, 750 F2d at 1080 (“Exceptions 
to this general common-law rule [of no recovery] have been made where the government 
incurs expenses to protect its own property.”). 
 15 Koch v Consolidated Edison Co of New York, 468 NE2d 1, 7–8 (NY 1984) (allowing 
city to recover for damage to city property, but disallowing recovery of “costs incurred for 
wages, salaries, overtime and other benefits”). 
 16 See, for example, Mayor and Council of City of Morgan City v Jesse J. Fontenot, 
Inc, 460 S2d 685, 687–88 (La App 1984) (rejecting the city’s compensation claim for the 
costs of fire suppression against a factory whose negligence caused the fire on the grounds 
that the factory bore no duty of care toward the city); County of San Luis Obispo v Abalone 
Alliance, 178 Cal App 3d 848, 865–66 (1986) (holding that the plaintiff cannot claim com-
pensation for costs incurred in sending police forces to deal with protesters committing 
intentional trespass as the defendants had no duty of care toward the plaintiff). 
 17 See In re TMI Litigation Governmental Entities Claims, 544 F Supp 853, 856–58 
(MD Pa 1982) (finding that the plaintiff’s claim for civil defense expenses and excessive 
government employee’s wages relates to pure economic losses, which are not compensable 
in the absence of personal injury or property damage), affd in part, vacd, and remd in part, 
Pennsylvania v General Public Utilities Corp, 710 F2d 117, 122–23 (3d Cir 1983). 
 18 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, and Ellen M. Bublick, Hornbook on Torts 1060 
(West 2d ed 2016) (“Economic harms or losses are financial costs to the plaintiff that do 
not arise from personal injury to the plaintiff or damage to tangible property . . . . Such a 
claim for pure economic loss will often be rejected.”). See also Restatement (Third) of Torts 
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the argument that the plaintiffs failed to show they were ad-
versely affected by the defendants’ misconduct. Because respond-
ing to risks (including those created by negligent individuals) is 
the preexisting duty of the governmental plaintiffs, the costs as-
sociated with governmental actions to perform this duty should 
not be considered “harm.”19 
However, acknowledging that the no-recovery rule substan-
tially subsidizes tortious activities and shifts the cost of harm 
from those engaging in risky activities to the taxpayers, courts 
have gradually limited its application. One approach has been to 
carve out additional exceptions to the free public services doc-
trine. Some courts, for example, have ruled that the doctrine pre-
cludes compensation claims by governmental entities only so long 
as the defendant’s fault was a lone occurrence rather than recur-
ring behavior.20 Other courts have held that the doctrine cannot 
apply when the defendants-beneficiaries and the governmental 
entity were in contractual relations (explicit or implied).21 A sec-
ond approach has been to broaden the scope of the doctrine’s 
standard exception regarding government-owned property. By in-
terpreting this term broadly, courts have limited the scope of the 
no-recovery rule and enabled governmental entities to claim com-
pensation in a variety of circumstances. For example, some courts 
have allowed the government to recover the costs of eliminating 
hazards that threaten to harm not only the property of individu-
als, but also public property.22 Courts have treated similarly the 
doctrinal objections of duty of care, pure economic loss, and preex-
isting duty to act, holding that just as they were rejected when 
 
§ 29, cmt c (2010) (“Generally, no- or limited-duty rules have been employed to limit lia-
bility for other harms, such as economic loss, for which tort law has historically provided 
less protection.”). 
 19 See, for example, Long Island Lighting Co, 493 NYS2d at 257 (denying the state 
recovery of the costs of diverting traffic from the vicinity of fallen power lines and ruling 
that “[t]he plaintiff may not recover damages for undertaking its duty to ensure the safety 
of the travelling public”). 
 20 See City of Boston v Smith & Wesson Corp, 12 Mass L Rptr 225, 231, 2000 WL 
1473568, *8 (Mass Super) (holding that the no-recovery rule does not apply when public 
expenditures are made following “a repeated course of conduct causing recurring costs to 
the municipality”). 
 21 See Lytton, 76 Tulane L Rev at 741–42 (cited in note 9) (providing an example of 
a case in which a court allowed recovery for public services on the basis of an explicit 
contractual relation). See also McIntyre, Note, 55 Fordham L Rev at 1032–34 (cited in 
note 9) (discussing cases involving quasi-contractual relations). 
 22 See, for example, State v Black Hills Power, Inc, 354 P3d 83, 88–89 (Wyo 2015) 
(holding that the government is entitled to recover the costs of eliminating risks created 
by the defendant’s negligence if its own property was at peril). 
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raised by defendants in analogous tort litigation, they should be re-
jected when raised by PGS beneficiaries against the government.23 
The expansion of governmental entities’ right to claim com-
pensation has not been limited to the case law. Legislative re-
forms at both the federal and state levels have broadened the 
scope of this right as well,  in two respects. First, statutes have 
been passed providing for a range of expenditures for which gov-
ernmental entities can claim recovery from beneficiaries. These 
statutes authorize governmental entities to collect compensation 
for services such as fire suppression,24 elimination and mitigation 
of environmental hazards,25 response to traffic-related accidents 
and risks,26 law enforcement efforts,27 medical treatment of vic-
tims,28 and provision of assistance to individuals in distress in 
various situations.29 Second, subsequent legislation increased the 
 
 23 See, for example, City of St Louis v Lead Industries Association, Inc, 2002 WL 
34395189, *65–72, 84 (Mo Cir) (upholding the city’s right to recover from manufacturers 
of lead-based paint while rejecting both the argument that the manufacturers had no duty 
of care and the argument that the claim should be dismissed under the pure economic loss 
doctrine); Smith & Wesson Corp, 12 Mass L Rptr at 232–35 (allowing the city to claim 
reimbursement for expenditures made in response to the defendant’s manufacturing and 
distribution of firearms even though these expenditures constitute only economic harm). 
 24 Cal Health & Safety Code § 13009 (“Any person [ ] who negligently . . . sets a fire 
. . . is liable for the fire suppression costs incurred in fighting the fire and for the cost of 
providing rescue or emergency medical services, and those costs shall be a charge against 
that person.”). 
 25 33 USC § 1321(b)(10) (“Any costs of removal incurred in connection with a dis-
charge [of a prohibited substance] . . . shall be recoverable from the owner or operator of 
the source of the discharge.”). 
 26 Cal Gov Code § 53150: 
Any person who is under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or any drug . . . 
whose negligent operation of a motor vehicle caused by that influence proxi-
mately causes any incident resulting in an appropriate emergency response . . . 
is liable for the expense of an emergency response by a public agency to the  
incident. 
 27 Idaho Code § 37-2732(k) (“[T]he court may order restitution for costs incurred by 
law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation.”). 
 28 Cal Gov Code § 53159:  
(a)(1) “Expenses of an emergency response” . . . include the cost of providing . . . 
emergency medical services at the scene of an incident . . . .  
(b) Any person who intentionally, knowingly, and willfully enters into any area 
that is closed or has been closed to the public . . . is liable for the expenses of an 
emergency response required to search for or rescue that person . . . . 
 29 NH Rev Stat § 153-A:24 (“A person shall be liable for response expenses if, in the 
judgment of the court, such person . . . [r]ecklessly or intentionally creates a situation re-
quiring an emergency response.”); Or Rev Stat § 404.270(1) (“A public body that has au-
thority to conduct search and rescue activities may collect an amount specified in this 
section as reimbursement for the cost of search and rescue activities . . . for the benefit of 
hikers, climbers, hunters and other users of wilderness areas.”); Va Code Ann § 44-
146.18:1(3) (“[The state] shall promptly seek reimbursement from any person causing or 
12 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1 
number of categories of potential liable beneficiaries. While the 
initial legislation permitted governmental entities to file compen-
sation claims against a limited set of beneficiaries, the more re-
cent regulation removed these limitations, enabling lawsuits to 
be brought against broad categories of beneficiaries.30 
In recent years, there has been a growing trend toward re-
stricting the no-recovery rule even further. An increasing number 
of cities and municipalities have passed regulations that impose 
broad reimbursement duties.31 These regulations require PGS 
beneficiaries to pay the costs (often described as “response costs”) 
incurred by local authorities such as the police and fire depart-
ments, emergency services units, and environmental protection 
squads when their action was necessitated by the beneficiaries’ 
faulty behavior. The wide scope of these new rules, as well as their 
rising popularity among local governments, has led to public crit-
icism and to state-government efforts aimed at repealing them.32 
These efforts have been somewhat successful; between 2008 and 
2011, twelve states enacted laws setting limitations on govern-
mental entities’ right to claim compensation for expenditures 
caused by beneficiaries’ negligence.33 The limitations set by these 
statutes vary among the jurisdictions, with some states opting for 
 
contributing to an emergency or disaster for [ ] . . . sums [incurred for] protection, relief 
and recovery from loss or damage caused by such person.”). 
 30 Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) and similar state legislation, for example, governmental entities 
can now demand recovery for their clean-up costs from a number of parties (beyond the 
polluter itself). 42 USC § 9601 et seq. See also note 144 and accompanying text. For a 
general discussion of CERCLA’s extended liability regime, see Melissa A. McGonigal, 
Comment, Extended Liability Under CERCLA: Easement Holders and the Scope of Con-
trol, 87 Nw U L Rev 992, 996–1020 (1993). 
 31 See, for example, Christopher Jensen, A Crash. A Call for Help. Then, a Bill. (NY 
Times, Sept 3, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/TX9U-X4FD (describing the rise in re-
covery claims brought by governmental entities, and noting that in at least twenty-six 
states, cities and municipalities now charge injurers, and sometimes victims, for services 
provided by local fire and police departments). 
 32 See id. 
 33 See Act of April 29, 2010, 2010 Ala Acts 1691, codified at Ala Code § 32-10-13; Act 
of April 13, 2011, 2011 Ariz Sess Laws 544, codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 28-677; Act of 
April 6, 2009, 2009 Ark Acts 5143, codified at Ark Code Ann § 27-53-307; Act of June 16, 
2009, 2009 Fla Laws 1914, codified at Fla Stat Ann §§ 125.01045, 166.0447; Act of May 
12, 2008, 2008 Ga Laws 490, codified at Ga Code Ann § 33-8-8.2; Act of March 19, 2008, 
2008 Ind Acts 146, codified at Ind Code Ann § 9-29-11.5, repealed by 2016 Ind Acts 198; 
Act of May 12, 2011, 2011 Kan Sess Laws 939, codified at Kan Stat Ann § 12-16,129; Act 
of July 13, 2007, 2007 Mo Laws 830, codified at Mo Ann Stat § 374.055; Act of May 27, 
2009, 2009 Okla Sess Laws 1813, codified at 47 Okla Stat Ann § 10-118; Act of December 
18, 2007, 2007 Pa Laws 461, codified at 53 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1392; Act of March 27, 
2008, 2008 Tenn Pub Acts 1, codified at Tenn Code Ann § 55-10-108; Act of March 22, 
2011, 2011 Utah Laws 978, codified at Utah Code Ann § 10-8-55.5. 
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only light restrictions and others adopting a more stringent ap-
proach.34 No state, however, has seen fit to sweepingly eliminate 
governmental entities’ right of recovery. Furthermore, the major-
ity of states have opted not to enact any similar legislation, 
thereby allowing cities and local municipalities within their juris-
diction to recover from negligent PGS beneficiaries. 
This transformation of beneficiary liability for PGS costs has 
led governmental entities to try to extend their right to compen-
sation to other areas.35 States, cities, and local municipalities 
have filed precedent-setting lawsuits against major industries 
(such as the cigarette, gun, and lead paint industries) for the costs 
they incurred in dealing with harms resulting from these indus-
tries’ products.36 Despite the complexity and novelty of these law-
suits, courts have shown considerable willingness to impose lia-
bility on these defendants.37 Consequently, although the free 
public services doctrine has not been abolished, its effect has been 
substantially diminished. 
B. Public Officials 
Public officials who suffer losses while responding to individ-
uals’ risky activities also have traditionally faced considerable ob-
stacles to claiming compensation.38 Under the “fireman’s rule,” 
 
 34 Under Pennsylvania law, for example, cities and municipalities may not recover 
for police services rendered in response to car accidents, and may only recover police- 
report-related costs in all other situations. In Utah, by contrast, the police can still recover 
for a host of services irrespective of the reason they arrived on the scene. Compare 53 Pa 
Cons Stat Ann § 1392, with Utah Code Ann § 10-8-55.5. 
 35 See Sara L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 Vand L Rev 1227, 1233–49 (2018) (showing 
the significant rise in litigation initiated by cities and municipalities to recover expendi-
tures made in response to the faulty behavior of injurers). 
 36 See id. See also Greg J. Carlson, Lead Paint: Who Will Bear the Cost of Abating 
the Latest Public Nuisance?, 59 Hastings L J 1553, 1560–70 (2007) (describing court rul-
ings in lead-paint cases in various jurisdictions and referring to tobacco and gun litiga-
tion). Most recently, cities and municipalities have filed tort claims in response to the opi-
oid epidemic, seeking reimbursement of costs from pharmaceutical companies and 
distributors. See, for example, In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, 2018 WL 
4895856, *8–10 (ND Ohio) (rejecting a pharmaceutical company’s argument that a city’s 
claim for reimbursement of costs is barred by the “free public services” doctrine).  
 37 For cases in which courts have acknowledged plaintiffs’ right of recovery against 
gun manufacturers and distributors while explicitly rejecting defendants’ reliance on the 
free public services doctrine, see Smith & Wesson Corp, 12 Mass L Rptr at 230–31; City of 
Cincinnati v Beretta U.S.A. Corp, 768 NE2d 1136, 1149–50 (Ohio 2002); City of Gary v 
Smith & Wesson Corp, 801 NE2d 1222, 1240–41 (Ind 2003); James v Arms Technology, 
Inc, 820 A2d 27, 47–49 (NJ Super 2003). The enactment of the Protection of Lawful Com-
merce in Arms Act, Pub L No 109-92, 119 Stat 2095 (2005), codified at 15 USC § 7901 et 
seq, however, immunized the gun industry against many such lawsuits. 
 38 See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Torts § 363 (West 2d ed 2014) (discussing the fireman’s 
rule and injurers’ “[l]imited duties [toward] professional risk-takers”). 
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courts generally reject claims filed by safety professionals injured 
in attending to the risks and harms that resulted from faulty be-
havior. The rule has been invoked in dismissing claims brought 
by “firefighters, police officers, ambulance drivers, emergency 
medical technicians, and other professional rescuers.”39 
Courts have offered several rationales for the fireman’s rule. 
The first decisions to apply the rule justified it based on the for-
mal premises liability rules.40 Since firefighters (and similar res-
cuers) are generally considered to be licensees, they are assumed 
to enter premises at their own peril, thereby waiving any future 
claims against the property owner. More recent cases have  
extended the fireman’s rule to also cover claims related to harms 
occurring outside the defendant’s land and have suggested that 
the rule is grounded on the special characteristics of the plaintiffs. 
Referring to the fireman’s special training as well as the pay-
ments they receive for performing their dangerous jobs, courts 
have ruled that they voluntarily exposed themselves to the risk 
and therefore cannot claim compensation.41 
Other decisions have held that the rule safeguards against 
excessive liability. Under this rationale, because public officials 
are entitled to publicly funded compensation (in the form of work-
ers compensation or similar benefits), they cannot seek further 
payments from PGS beneficiaries, who have already paid com-
pensation through their taxes.42 Some commentators shift the fo-
cus of the rationale to beneficiaries’ incentives. They maintain 
that by eliminating the risk of liability for harm caused to rescu-
ers, the rule incentivizes beneficiaries not to hesitate to call for 
 
 39 See Robert H. Heidt, When Plaintiffs Are Premium Planners for Their Injuries: A 
Fresh Look at the Fireman’s Rule, 82 Ind L J 745, 745–46 (2007) (providing examples for 
cases in which professional rescuers were denied recovery based on the fireman’s rule). 
 40 For a collection of cases, see Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Liability of Owner or 
Occupant of Premises to Fireman Coming Thereon in Discharge of His Duty, 11 ALR4th 
597, 602–07 (1981); Richard C. Tinney, Annotation, Liability of Owner or Occupant of 
Premises to Police Officer Coming Thereon in Discharge of Officer’s Duty, 30 ALR4th 81, 
89–98 (1981). 
 41 See, for example, Krauth v Geller, 157 A2d 129, 130–31 (NJ 1960) (holding that 
the plaintiff-firefighter cannot claim compensation for harm caused while rendering ser-
vices “for which he is trained and paid”). 
 42 See, for example, Kiernan v Miller, 612 A2d 1344, 1346 (NJ Super 1992): 
[T]he taxpayer who pays the fire and police departments to confront the risks 
occasioned by his own future acts of negligence does not expect to pay again 
when the officer is injured while exposed to those risks. Otherwise, individual 
citizens would compensate police officers twice: once for risking injury, once for 
sustaining it. 
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assistance when loss might still be prevented or minimized by 
professionals.43 
Similar to the free public services doctrine, the fireman’s rule 
is facing increasing criticism for diluting beneficiaries’ incentives 
to take proper precautions. A number of states have abolished the 
rule altogether or statutorily limited its scope.44 In states where 
the rule still applies, its scope has been narrowed through sub-
stantial exceptions. One group of these exceptions relates to in-
stances in which the defendant’s behavior is found to be grossly 
unreasonable. For example, multiple courts have held that the 
fireman’s rule will not preclude claims when a beneficiary’s risky 
behavior was intentional or willful.45 Other courts have restricted 
the application of the rule when a beneficiary could have warned 
the rescuer about the risk that eventually led to the latter’s injury 
but refrained from doing so, or when the beneficiary’s behavior 
was in violation of an explicit safety ordinance or regulation.46 
The rule’s application has been restricted, moreover, even 
when a wrongdoer or rescuee’s behavior did not manifest gross 
unreasonableness. Most states now allow recovery when the 
plaintiff-rescuer’s harm resulted from a different risk than the 
risk that “necessitates [their] presence” in the first place.47 Thus, 
a police officer who was injured by a negligent driver while issu-
ing a speeding ticket to another driver can claim compensation 
 
 43 See Prosser & Keeton at 431 (cited in note 14) (“The argument sometimes offered[ ] 
[is] that tort liability might deter landowners from uttering such cries of distress [to po-
licemen and firemen].”) (citation omitted). Judges, following Prosser (who notes that the 
argument is “preposterous”), have been skeptical about this concern. Id. As wrongdoers 
seek to both protect themselves and minimize compensation to potential victims, whether 
they are liable for the rescuers’ harm arguably should have little effect on their incentives 
to call for help. See, for example, Hannah v Jensen, 298 NW2d 52, 56 (Minn 1980) (Scott 
dissenting) (rejecting the argument as justification for the fireman’s rule). 
 44 See Minnich v Med-Waste, Inc, 564 SE2d 98, 102–03 (SC 2002) (reviewing legisla-
tion that abrogates or significantly constrains the application of the rule in California, 
Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, and Virginia). See also Heidt, 82 Ind 
L J 745 at 746 n 3 (cited in note 39) (reviewing a similar statute in Michigan). 
 45 See, for example, Miller v Inglis, 567 NW2d 253, 256 (Mich App 1997) (“[A] tort-
feasor who acts wilfully and wantonly is so culpable that the fireman’s rule ought not to 
preclude the injured officer from suing the egregiously culpable wrongdoer.”). 
 46 See, for example, Bartholomew v Klinger, 53 Cal App 3d 975, 978–81 (1975) (hold-
ing that the fireman’s rule did not preclude liability for a police officer’s injury caused by 
“a known concealed defect [ ] on the premises” that the “defendant failed to warn” the 
officer about “despite [having] the opportunity to do so”); Mullen v Zoebe, Inc, 654 NE2d 
90, 91–92 (NY 1995) (holding that a firefighter injured while evacuating residents can 
recover from the building owner after showing that the owner violated safety regulations). 
 47 See, for example, Moody v Delta Western, Inc, 38 P3d 1139, 1141 (Alaska 2002) 
(“[T]he Firefighter’s Rule does not apply to negligent conduct occurring after the police 
officer or firefighter arrives at the scene or to misconduct other than that which necessi-
tates the officer’s presence.”). 
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from the negligent driver who hit him because the officer was pre-
sent only due to the speeding driver’s traffic violation.48 Similarly, 
a firefighter who was harmed by a homeowner’s guard dog is en-
titled to damages because the dog was not the reason for the fire-
fighter’s presence on the premises.49 
The tenuous status of the fireman’s rule is perhaps most evi-
dent in how it was treated by the drafters of the new Restatement 
of Torts. Despite the rule’s long history and its continued endorse-
ment by some courts, the drafters noted that its primary tradi-
tional justification (identification of professional rescuers as “li-
censees” who assume the risk of harm) is no longer persuasive.50 
Taking into account the extensive criticism of the rule as well as 
its many exceptions, the drafters decided to take “no position” in 
the debate over the desirability of the rule and its scope.51 
C. Assessment 
Presently, there is a tendency on the part of both courts and 
legislatures to curtail the free public services doctrine and fire-
man’s rule. The underlying rationale for this is that PGS benefi-
ciaries should internalize the entire cost of their faulty behavior. 
This internalization is just because it makes the negligent party 
compensate the nonnegligent party for the latter’s losses. It is ef-
ficient because it forces PGS beneficiaries to take into account 
those potential losses in conducting their affairs. 
Although counterarguments can be made in favor of main-
taining the no-recovery rule, none seem particularly compelling. 
As noted, the main argument made in support of the free public 
services doctrine is that beneficiaries have already paid with their 
taxes for the services rendered to them by the government. This 
is an unconvincing justification for the rule, however, because it 
presupposes that a tax payment is intended to cover the costs in-
curred by the government pursuant to the taxpayer’s wrongdoing. 
This is a questionable assumption: Would it not make more sense 
that a taxpayer whose negligence increased government expenses 
pay more to cover those costs than taxpayers who commit no 
 
 48 See Harris-Fields v Syze, 600 NW2d 611, 615–16 (Mich 1999). 
 49 See Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, and Ellen M. Bublick, Torts and Compensation: 
Personal Accountability and Social Responsibility for Injury 330–34 (West 6th ed 2009). 
 50 See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 51, cmt m (2010) (“Whatever the rationale be-
hind limiting land possessors’ liability to professional rescuers injured in the course of 
performing their duties, the movement away from the original status-based justifications 
requires rethinking the firefighter rule and, if it is retained, adapting its scope to the ra-
tionale justifying its continuation.”). 
 51 Id. 
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wrongs? Another argument, which is applicable to both the free 
public services doctrine and the fireman’s rule, is that beneficiar-
ies who know they will be liable for the costs of governmental ser-
vices will hesitate in requesting them in the first place; they will 
instead attempt to contend with the hazard themselves even if 
they lack the proper capacity to do so. This argument is also un-
persuasive. When the governmental entity is the cheapest cost 
avoider, it is by definition less costly for the potential beneficiary 
to ask for its assistance—even if he will bear the costs of that as-
sistance—than handling the risks himself. Certainly, there are 
irrational beneficiaries or beneficiaries who lack information 
about the risks and might refrain from calling for governmental 
assistance. But it is (at least) unclear whether this subset of irra-
tional and uninformed beneficiaries would behave differently if 
they were not liable toward the government for its costs. It is also 
unclear whether this specific concern counteracts the benefits of 
a liability rule, which provides potential beneficiaries with effi-
cient incentives to reduce risks before they materialize. 
The arguments supporting the fireman’s rule are even less 
convincing. As mentioned, a central rationale offered for the rule 
is that public officials willingly expose themselves to the risk of 
harm while being paid for their risky jobs. However, this argu-
ment makes the implicit—unfounded—assumption that public of-
ficials assume the risk of being injured due to a wrongdoing with-
out compensation. We can see no good reason to endorse such an 
assumption. Another justification for the rule is that because pub-
lic officials recover for injuries under workers’ compensation 
schemes, they should not be allowed to recover from beneficiaries. 
Yet even if there is good reason not to allow public officials to sue 
negligent beneficiaries, there is nothing to justify not allowing the 
government to bring indemnification suits against these individ-
uals. Indeed, the same reasons for not allowing the government 
to recover its expenses in providing services can arguably be ap-
plied in this context: there is no difference, after all, between costs 
incurred to compensate officials and costs incurred in providing 
PGS. It is doubtful, however, whether this argument suffices, for 
the justice and efficiency arguments supporting beneficiary liabil-
ity are more appealing when bodily injuries, rather than mone-
tary costs, are at stake. 
In sum, at first glance, the arguments supporting the free 
public services doctrine and the fireman’s rule seem much weaker 
than the counterarguments opposing these rules. In the next 
Part, we show that this impression is false. 
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II.  WHY NO LIABILITY? 
In this Part, we will show that, contrary to the conventional 
view, making negligent PGS beneficiaries liable for the costs of 
services does not produce optimal care. Even when beneficiaries 
are required to fully reimburse governmental entities, their 
harm-prevention incentives are not aligned with the maximiza-
tion of social welfare. The reason for this is that the reimburse-
ment accounts for only the losses incurred by governmental enti-
ties and ignores the harm deriving from depriving others of public 
services. This Part, moreover, demonstrates how current analysis 
has disregarded the distorting effect of beneficiary liability on the 
incentives of governmental entities and officials, which under-
mines beneficiaries’ incentives to efficiently prevent harm. 
Part II.A presents the overlooked externality costs—or harms—
involved in the consumption of PGS. Part II.B discusses how the 
imposition of liability for PGS widens the scope of cases in which 
beneficiaries’ care incentives are distorted. Building on the analyses 
in the first two sections, Part II.C then assesses the social desir-
ability of making negligent beneficiaries liable for the costs in-
curred by governmental entities in providing PGS. Part II.D 
points out some limitations of the analysis conducted in Part II.C. 
A. The Social Costs of PGS 
1. The basic argument. 
Personal government services are a substitute for private in-
vestment in care. When the costs to governmental entities, and 
officials, of eliminating risks or ameliorating harms are lower 
than the costs to private parties to take corresponding care 
measures, efficient harm prevention is rendered through govern-
mental action. Conversely, when private investment in care can 
reduce harm at a low cost, social welfare is maximized when there 
is no governmental intervention in preventing harms. When mul-
tiple precaution alternatives are available, optimal harm preven-
tion often requires a combination of public and private invest-
ment in care.52 
 
 52 As economic theory has long shown, in bilateral-care cases, when both injurers 
and victims can invest in harm prevention, efficiency is usually attained when both parties 
take care. This outcome is predicated on the diminishing marginal return on parties’ in-
vestments in care. See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 205–11  
(Pearson 6th ed 2012) (discussing how a negligence rule can lead to efficient precautions 
by both victims and injurers). Analogously, in our context, optimal harm prevention would 
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The need to balance between public and private care 
measures suggests that optimal harm prevention entails consid-
ering differences between individuals’ relative costs of care. Spe-
cifically, PGS should be provided to individuals for whom the cost 
of eliminating or reducing risks would exceed the cost to the gov-
ernment to take the same measures. By contrast, individuals who 
can eliminate or reduce risks at a lower cost (in other words, be-
low the cost to the government) should be required to take pre-
cautions and not drain the public fisc. 
This tradeoff between private and public investment in care 
is illustrated by Example 1. While Example 1 focuses on the im-
plications of negligent beneficiaries’ duty to reimburse govern-
mental entities, it is equally applicable to the duty to compensate 
officials. In addition, although Example 1 relates to the provision 
of PGS to negligent rescuees (such as a self-inflicted injury case), 
it is no less applicable to the provision of PGS to wrongdoers (in 
other words, when a beneficiary’s wrongdoing exposes others to 
risk). Finally, Example 1 illustrates a case of simultaneous res-
cue,53 but as we explain below, the analysis holds for sequential 
circumstances as well (that is, when the governmental entity is 
required to rescue only one potential beneficiary at a time). 
Example 1.  Two factories are operating in the same indus-
trial area. There is a 10 percent annual risk that a fire will break 
out due to natural causes. If this happens, and no precautions 
have been taken, each factory will suffer a loss of 100. Factory A 
can spray a fire retardant at an annual cost of 7, which would 
save Factory A from the fire (but would not affect the probability 
of its occurrence). Factory B, by contrast, cannot take any effi-
cient precautions. If a fire erupts, the local fire station can send 
its fire trucks to put out the fire at a cost of 20. However, the 
trucks’ water tanks are sufficient to save only one of the factories. 
From a social perspective, optimal care requires that  
Factory A take precautions (spray a fire retardant) and Factory B 
rely on public services (firefighters). Under this scenario, neither 
of the factories will be harmed and total social costs (Factory A’s  
 
 
often require that both potential beneficiaries (injurers) and governmental entities (vic-
tims) take care. 
 53 For a description of some recent examples in which resource-constrained govern-
mental entities were required to provide simultaneous rescues upon the occurrence of nat-
ural disasters, disease outbreaks, and terror attacks and the policy questions such rescues 
raise, see Sheri Fink, Whose Lives Should Be Saved? Researchers Ask the Public (NY 
Times, Aug 21, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/ACK2-AARB. Of course, simultaneous 
rescues also arise in less extreme situations. 
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costs of spraying and the local fire station’s costs of care) equal 9 
(7 + (10% × 20)). This combination of private and public invest-
ment in care reflects the government’s limited ability to provide 
its services (at a low cost) to more than one factory at a time,54 as 
well as the difference between the prevention costs each factory 
would incur. 
Consider now Factory A’s care incentives under a no-liability 
regime for negligent PGS beneficiaries. If Factory A takes proper 
care, it eliminates the risk of harm at a cost of 7. Alternatively, if 
it does not take care, it faces a 10 percent risk of suffering harm 
of 100 (expected harm of 10). This harm, however, will not mate-
rialize if Factory A is rescued by the firefighters. Considering that 
in the event of a fire both factories face the same expected harm, 
the firefighters will randomly choose between the two. Factory A 
thus has a 50 percent chance of suffering no harm if a fire breaks 
out, making its expected overall cost equal to 5 (10% × 50% × 100) 
if it takes no care. Because this is lower than the cost of spraying 
a fire retardant (7 > 5), Factory A is better off taking no care un-
der a no-liability regime.55 
Intuitively, it would seem that Factory A’s suboptimal care 
incentives result from its ability to free ride on the public invest-
ment in fire suppression: since Factory A is not liable for the fire 
department’s costs, it takes less than optimal care. As explained, 
this concern has been the central justification for expanding gov-
ernmental entities’ right to recover from wrongdoers. 
To see why this reasoning is misguided, however, consider 
now a regime under which a factory benefiting from firefighting 
services must reimburse the government for its costs. This  
reimbursement would be from the factory’s own resources, since 
property insurance policies usually cover only direct losses and 
exclude payments required by governmental agencies.56 While 
this regime increases the factory’s cost of refraining from spray-
ing fire retardant, it would nevertheless still be in Factory A’s 
 
 54 For further discussion on the constraints of governmental entities in providing 
public services, see text accompanying note 57. 
 55 Theoretically, the two factories might enter a Coasean agreement, under which 
Factory B pays Factory A to take precautions. In practice, however, transaction costs are 
likely to be prohibitively high, so that bargaining between the two factories is infeasible. 
 56 See, for example, Robert Passmore, Fighting Back Against the Crash Tax Trend 
(CLM Magazine, June 2, 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/DLE8-MEWH (“These fees 
[claimed by governmental entities] generally do not fit the standard definition of either 
property damage or bodily injury coverage. Although ambulance services often are paid as 
part of medical expense coverage, police and fire services have always been funded through 
tax dollars.”). 
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best interest to take no care. Although Factory A would now have 
to pay 20 if it is rescued from a fire, its overall cost of taking no 
care would still be lower than the cost of spraying. Specifically, 
Factory A’s cost of taking no care is comprised of the risk of suf-
fering harm (10% × 50% × 100) and the cost of reimbursing the 
government (10% × 50% × 20), which amounts to an overall cost 
of 6. As the cost of spraying remains greater (7 > 6), Factory A is 
still incentivized to take no care. Table 1 summarizes Factory A’s 
costs as a function of its care level under both regimes, presenting 
its benefits from not spraying fire retardant. 
TABLE 1: FACTORY A’S COSTS 







(10% × 50% × 100) 
6 
(10% × 50% × 100) + 
(10% × 50% × 20) 
 
As illustrated by Example 1, the social harm from Factory A’s 
suboptimal level of care is not represented by the costs to the fire 
department in rendering its services but, rather, by the exposure 
of Factory B to the risk of not being rescued. By not spraying a 
fire retardant, Factory A saves itself 7. This, however, produces 
an expected harm of 10 (10% × 100), as in the event of a fire, one 
of the factories will be harmed. Factory A’s behavior, therefore, 
reduces social welfare by 3 (10 – 7). 
Ideally, Factory A (like similarly situated property owners) 
will have efficient incentives to take optimal care if it bears lia-
bility for the harm suffered by Factory B rather than for the costs 
incurred by the fire department (the latter costs will arise regard-
less of whether Factory A takes care). Only in this way will  
Factory A internalize the full social costs of a failure to take opti-
mal care, and its incentives will align with the maximization of 
social welfare. Under such a liability regime, if Factory A fails to 
take care, its expected liability will be 5 (10% × 50% × 100). Since 
Factory A will bear its own self-risk of 5 (10% × 50% × 100), it will 
take care so long as the cost of spraying fire retardant is less than 
10 (5 + 5), as efficiency requires. 
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2. Refinements. 
a) Strict liability.  Instead of a fault-based legal regime, 
one could imagine a strict liability rule, under which beneficiaries 
compensate the government for PGS regardless of fault. There 
could be various reasons against adopting such a legal rule (for 
example, we do not want innocent victims of crime to compensate 
the police for its costs in protecting them)—and in fact, no legal 
system has adopted such a liability regime. But more im-
portantly, it would not cure the inefficiencies described in 
Part II.A.1: even under a strict liability regime, Factory A would 
be better off taking no precautions, given the possibility of being 
rescued by the fire department. 
b) Selective rescues.  Theoretically, the inefficiency de-
scribed in the previous Section would be resolved if the fire  
department would not rescue negligent beneficiaries before it res-
cues beneficiaries who took proper care. We assume here—quite 
realistically—that typically it is impossible to implement such a 
strategy because it is hard to know before committing the rescue 
whether rescuees are negligent. Such a strategy would also not 
pass public—and probably judicial—scrutiny; punishing negli-
gent beneficiaries by not rescuing them would often be a dispro-
portionate sanction. 
c) Sequential need for services.  Our analysis of Example 1, 
which deals with a simultaneous need for PGS, can be similarly 
applied to cases of a sequential need for services. In the latter 
circumstances, providing PGS to negligent beneficiaries leads to 
a reduction in the quality or quantity of services provided to fu-
ture beneficiaries. This is due to the limited ability of governmen-
tal entities to provide services to all beneficiaries in need, even if 
beneficiaries pay the costs of their rescue. 
More specifically, because governmental services include sig-
nificant fixed and infrastructure costs, governmental entities’ ca-
pacity to provide their services is constrained.57 A fire station has 
only a certain number of trucks and crews. Thus, even if negligent 
beneficiaries were subject to a reimbursement duty—that is, paid 
the direct or marginal cost of sending a fire truck to save them—
 
 57 Fixed and infrastructure costs include investments in construction of fire stations, 
purchase of equipment, and training of firefighters. Marginal costs include costs such as 
the water used to extinguish fires. See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 27 (cited 
in note 52) (distinguishing between fixed and variable costs). In some cases, fixed costs 
can be the primary mandatory investment in harm prevention. See, for example, Rebecca 
R. Roberts, et al, Distribution of Variable vs Fixed Costs of Hospital Care, 7 JAMA 644, 646–
47 (1999) (arguing that the majority of costs in providing hospital services are fixed costs). 
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the fire station would still not be able to serve an unlimited num-
ber of beneficiaries. In a similar vein, hospitals that maintain a 
fixed number of beds would be constrained by their ability to pro-
vide medical treatment to patients, even if the latter shouldered 
the marginal costs of their treatment. In response to excessive 
demand, fire stations, hospitals, and other governmental entities 
would have to lower the quality of their services (for example, 
send fewer trucks, hospitalize patients for shorter periods) or pro-
vide these services selectively (for example, attend to only some 
calls for rescue, admit fewer patients). 
Furthermore, even if governmental entities could provide 
their services with no limitations, the cost of providing these ser-
vices typically increases with the number of beneficiaries. Bene-
ficiaries who enjoy the public service raise the cost of providing it 
to subsequent beneficiaries, thereby giving rise to the same exter-
nality problem we have identified in Example 1.58 To make bene-
ficiaries internalize the full cost of the public service they con-
sume, liability should be imposed for the full social cost of their 
consumption. This cost is either the harm caused to subsequent 
beneficiaries who received inferior services, or the increase in the 
cost of providing adequate services to those subsequent benefi-
ciaries. Therefore, under a reimbursement regime that obliges 
beneficiaries to pay just for direct or marginal costs, potential 
beneficiaries also in the sequential setting would excessively rely 
on PGS and take suboptimal care.59 
d) Liability for average cost.  Charging negligent benefi-
ciaries the government’s average (rather than marginal) cost does 
not resolve the inefficiencies. To see this, consider a public service 
the government can supply at an increasing cost, such that 
providing it to the first and second beneficiaries entails a respec-
tive cost of 1 and 5 (for an average cost of 3). Suppose that each 
beneficiary can avoid consuming the public service by using her 
own resources. Specifically, the first beneficiary can do so at a cost 
 
 58 Consider, for example, the provision of medical treatment. A surgeon can treat 
(sequentially) several patients a day. However, beyond a certain number of patients, the 
hospital must pay the surgeon for overtime (and as she gets tired, the surgeon is also more 
likely to harm patients). The earlier patients thus increase the cost of providing service to 
later patients. Under a reimbursement regime, the early patients only partly internalize 
the cost of their benefit. 
 59 An extensive literature in economics and political science debates the question of 
“how big the government should be”—that is, the question of determining optimal govern-
ment spending and optimal taxation. For a recent overview and discussion of this litera-
ture, see generally Jon Bakija, et al, How Big Should Our Government Be? (California 
2016). As our analysis suggests, however, even with optimal governmental spending and 
taxation, maximization of social welfare mandates optimal PGS liability rules. 
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of 3.5 and the second beneficiary at a cost of 4.5. Socially, it is 
desirable that only the second beneficiary consume the public ser-
vice and that the first beneficiary use her own resources, for a 
total cost of 4.5 (1 + 3.5). However, under a regime in which ben-
eficiaries must each pay 3 (the average cost), both would consume 
the public service (for a total cost of 6). Charging the first benefi-
ciary the average cost fails to make her internalize the rise in the 
cost of providing the service to the second beneficiary. 
e) Implementing full ex post internalization.  Let us con-
sider whether full internalization of social costs by a negligent 
beneficiary is a feasible option. The answer seems to be no, at 
least in most cases. In practice, it is hard to imagine a legal re-
gime in which Factory B in Example 1 could sue Factory A for the 
latter’s failure to take optimal precautions. One reason is that the 
cost of information necessary to bring such a claim would tend to 
be prohibitively high. In this example, there are only two facto-
ries, and under the stated circumstances, only Factory A should 
take precautionary measures. In reality, there are many factories 
involved—many different property owners—with different costs 
of care and different expected harms. Therefore, it is difficult to 
identify a specific property owner whose failure to take proper 
care makes her liable for the harm to another property owner. But 
even if this information hurdle could be resolved (or if liability 
had been strict), it would be a daunting task for courts to measure 
the externalities created by each and every negligent (or even 
nonnegligent) property owner and impose liability accordingly. In 
particular, how would a court assess the harm caused to society—
or any individual victim—by one specific property owner who 
failed to take care and thereby “consumed” scarce public re-
sources at the expense of others? Often, the externalities are re-
mote, indirect, and difficult to trace back to any specific benefi-
ciary. Similar difficulties would arise in the cases where the need 
for services is sequential rather than simultaneous. 
f) An alternative ex post internalization rule?  Instead of im-
posing liability for the actual full social costs, liability could be 
imposed for the average full social costs. Such a rule would result 
in a schedule of recovery amounts that takes into account all pos-
sible parameters needed to calculate the average social costs—
including costs borne by third parties—emanating from a benefi-
ciary’s failure to take care. In cases represented by Example 1, 
parameters considered in calculating the average social costs are 
the day of the week and specific hour at which the fire erupted, 
the equipment and manpower available to the fire department at 
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the relevant times, the population density and property values in 
the area, and other factors. Under such a liability rule, there 
would be no need to prove actual harm or to establish a causal 
relationship between the failure to take care and any material-
ized harm. Producing a schedule of recovery for average social 
costs is not cost free; yet it may be preferable to a liability rule 
that is based on actual social cost, or to the rule of reimbursement 
of costs. 
* * * 
In the next Section, we turn to the effect of allowing recovery 
for public expenditures on the incentives of governmental enti-
ties, which in turn distort beneficiaries’ incentives. These effects 
have been completely overlooked thus far by legal writers. 
B. Incentives of Governmental Entities 
As Example 1 demonstrates, allowing governmental entities 
to claim recovery for the costs of public services rendered to neg-
ligent beneficiaries does not eliminate the latter’s incentives to 
take suboptimal care. To create such incentives, liability should 
cover all social costs, including costs to third parties. In this  
Section, however, we show that rendering beneficiaries ex post 
liable for such costs could actually expand the range of cases in 
which they benefit from careless behavior. The reason for this is 
that under a liability regime, governmental entities would pro-
vide PGS discriminatorily: the wealthy would receive more and 
better services than the poor because of their better ability to pay 
compensation.60 We analyze below the incentive structure of gov-
ernmental entities with or without beneficiary liability for PGS 
and the expected responses of potential beneficiaries under each 
regime. First, however, we will bring support for our claim that 
governmental entities are in general influenced in their decision-
making by the availability of a monetary reward. We argue that 
PGS providers are no exception. 
 
 60 Earlier scholarship suggested a related bias in the provision of governmental ser-
vices. According to some studies and reports, cities sometimes allocate their resources in 
a way that favors wealthier residents, and emergency-services providers tend to respond 
more slowly, if at all, to calls for help from poor residents. One reason is that wealthier 
residents have more political power and, therefore, satisfying them is more important to 
elected officials. See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 Fordham L Rev 1715, 
1724–27, 1729–30 (2006) (addressing lack of criminal enforcement and government ser-
vices in urban areas). Our analysis shows that this bias will be stronger and very general 
in scope if residents are made liable for PGS. 
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1. The government and monetary incentives. 
Because governmental entities are not profit oriented, they 
are ostensibly indifferent to monetary incentives. Yet a growing 
body of research shows that the availability of financial rewards 
or existence of financial liability influences the behavior of gov-
ernmental entities. 
In a recent study, Professors Michael Frakes and Melissa 
Wasserman examined the interplay between monetary incentives 
and patterns of patent issuance by the Patent and Trademark  
Office (PTO).61 The study took advantage of the research oppor-
tunity that presented itself in the funding reform the PTO under-
went in the early 1990s. Prior to the reform, funding for the PTO 
came directly from Congress. In 1991, however, Congress 
switched to a funding scheme whereby the PTO was required to 
fund its own budget through user fees, rather than receiving di-
rect financial support.62 
Analyzing large data before and after 1991, Frakes and  
Wasserman investigated the effect of the funding reform on the 
PTO’s patent decisions.63 Their findings indicate a significant 
change in the patterns of patent grants. After the reform, the PTO 
increased the rate at which patents were granted for technologies 
most likely to yield renewal fees—the type of fee that is most prof-
itable for the PTO.64 At the same time, patent applications filed 
by large firms, which are known to renew their patents and there-
fore pay the fees, were being approved at substantially higher 
rates.65 
Frakes and Wasserman’s study looked at how introducing 
monetary incentives influenced the behavior of one particular 
government agency. Another recent study, conducted by Profes-
sors Margaret Lemos and Max Minzner, takes a broader look at 
the significance of financial incentives.66 Lemos and Minzner 
 
 61 See generally Michael D. Frakes and Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding 
Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 Vand 
L Rev 67 (2013). 
 62 See id at 76–80 (presenting the changes in the PTO’s funding system). 
 63 Id at 92–96. 
 64 See id at 101–07 (discussing these findings). See also id at 88–89 (discussing the 
high profitability of renewal fees compared to other fee types from the PTO’s standpoint). 
 65 Frakes and Wasserman, 66 Vand L Rev at 107–09 (cited in note 61) (analyzing 
data before and after 1991 and showing the increase in approval of patent applications to 
patent applicants who are large entities). 
 66 See Margaret H. Lemos and Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 
Harv L Rev 853, 895–912 (2014). 
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demonstrated the reliance of an array of federal and state agen-
cies on enforcement measures imposing monetary sanctions.67 
Agencies at both the federal and state levels show a great appetite 
for monetary sanctions, although evidence suggests that the  
effectiveness of such sanctions might well be lower than nonmon-
etary sanctions.68 Like Frakes and Wasserman, Lemos and 
Minzner attribute this phenomenon to public enforcers’ need to 
supplement perpetually shrinking funding.69 However, one of 
Lemos and Minzner’s key findings was that even if public enforc-
ers cannot “eat what they kill” and must hand over all their col-
lected funds to the general treasury, their use of monetary sanc-
tions remains extensive. Lemos and Minzner show that these 
public enforcers derive two benefits from devoting enforcement 
resources to imposing monetary sanctions. First, dollars are 
quantifiable. A governmental agency seeking to influence public 
perception can present its achievements straightforwardly by 
pointing to the large amounts it has collected.70 Second, and even 
more critically, agencies use the money raised through sanctions 
as an important bargaining chip when negotiating their budgets 
with the executive branch.71 
The studies conducted by Frakes and Wasserman, and Lemos 
and Minzner, may appear to be of limited applicability in one im-
portant respect: they focus on governmental entities whose re-
sponsibilities do not concern the provision of vital services. In-
deed, it can be argued that when human lives are at stake, 
governmental entities consider how to best perform their public 
duties and disregard private gains. Yet studies comparing public 
hospitals’ treatment of insured and noninsured patients, includ-
ing patients in critical condition, have shown that financial incen-
tives play an important role in the hospitals’ treatment decisions. 
Specifically, in a number of studies, researchers found that 
public hospitals are more reluctant to admit uninsured patients 
who are unable to cover the costs of their medical treatment; 
moreover, they tend to hospitalize such patients for shorter  
periods of time and provide them with fewer and lower-quality 
 
 67 See id at 863–86 (providing numerous examples of the imposition of monetary 
sanctions by public enforcers). 
 68 See id at 895. 
 69 See id at 871–72 (demonstrating the dependence of resource-constrained public 
enforcers on the proceeds obtained through imposition of monetary sanctions). 
 70 See Lemos and Minzner, 127 Harv L Rev at 875–86 (cited in note 66) (elaborating 
on public enforcers’ reputational incentives). 
 71 See id at 873–75 (showing the efforts of public enforcers to publicize their ability 
to self-finance their activities as a bargaining strategy). 
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treatments than insured patients.72 This bias against uninsured 
patients translates into reduced chances of recovery and higher 
mortality rates. One influential study, for example, found that the 
average hospital stay of uninsured patients is significantly 
shorter (by 12 to 38 percent) than insured patients’ stays in cases 
in which the attending doctors have high discretion regarding the 
optimal treatment.73 In addition, controlling for various variables, 
this same study found that hospitals’ bias against uninsured pa-
tients increases the latter’s risk for in-hospital death, for many 
demographics, by 20 to 220 percent.74  
Police and incarceration practices are similarly shaped by fi-
nancial incentives. An illuminating example is Professor Aurélie 
Ouss’s recent investigation of the implications of the California 
legislature’s decision to raise the fees paid by local counties for 
imprisoning juvenile offenders in the state incarceration system.75 
Although this reform made no changes to the substantive law of 
juvenile criminal liability, it did, nonetheless, lead to a significant 
drop in the rate of incarceration of young offenders and a corre-
sponding rise in the resort to probation.76 Other scholars have 
similarly shown that police departments facing budget cuts often 
respond by increasing the enforcement of offences that offer par-
ticularly high returns on the enforcement investments.77 Finan-
cially challenged police departments, for instance, have been 
found to increase the ticketing of drivers for speeding, because 
low enforcement costs yield high proceeds.78 
 
 72 For reviews of the literature, see Bryan A. Liang, Access to Health Care in the 
United States: A Symposium Overview and Commentary, 22 J Legal Med 211, 212–13 
(2001) (listing studies showing that hospitals tend to give better care to insured patients); 
Barak D. Richman, Behavioral Economics and Health Policy: Understanding Medicaid’s 
Failure, 90 Cornell L Rev 705, 715–16 (2005) (same). 
 73 Jack Hadley, Earl P. Steinberg, and Judith Feder, Comparison of Uninsured and 
Privately Insured Hospital Patients: Condition on Admission, Resource Use, and Outcome, 
265 JAMA 374, 377 (1991). 
 74 Id at 378. 
 75 Aurélie Ouss, Incentive Structures and Criminal Justice § 2, *4–6 (working paper, 
2017), archived at https://perma.cc/V95J-UC8N. 
 76 See id § 4, *10–13 (showing a drop of approximately 50 percent likelihood of being 
sent into juvenile imprisonment while finding no corresponding drop in the imprisonment 
of adult offenders). 
 77 For a recent analysis of the prevalence of monetary payments in the criminal jus-
tice context and their effect on the law enforcement incentives of various actors, see Wayne 
A. Logan and Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U Ill L Rev 1175, 1185–
96 (showing the broadening scope of payments that public entities may collect from offend-
ers before, during, and after trial and their potential biasing effect). 
 78 See, for example, Thomas A. Garrett and Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in the Rearview 
Mirror: Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J L & Econ 71, 83–88 
(2010) (analyzing data and showing that ticketing increases in volume along with budgetary 
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The empirical literature on forfeiture laws also exposes the 
interplay between financial incentives and law enforcement ef-
forts. Scholars investigating the effects of forfeiture laws have 
shown that the adoption of forfeiture as a viable enforcement 
measure has led enforcement agencies to adjust their behavior. 
Rather than focusing on lowering crime levels, police forces often 
direct their enforcement tactics at maximizing the value of the 
forfeited property.79 
The forfeiture literature also suggests that whether the police 
are allowed to keep offenders’ property is of limited significance. 
State laws differ in their rules on the allocation of forfeiture pro-
ceeds. While several states permit enforcement agencies to keep 
the proceeds, others require them to remit some or even all of the 
amount to the general treasury or to a designated public purpose 
such as education or compensation of crime victims.80 Looking at 
the rates of forfeiture activities across states, researchers have 
found no significant difference between jurisdictions in which the 
police are not permitted to retain forfeited property and jurisdic-
tions that allow it.81 This further corroborates Lemos and 
Minzner’s findings regarding the broad effects of financial re-
wards even when the monetary benefits are channeled into the 
general public funds. 
 
stress). See also Logan and Wright, 2014 U Ill L Rev at 1194 (cited in note 77) and text accom-
panying notes 146–51 (examples of when police and prosecutors enforce offenses involving 
high monetary penalties to increase revenues). 
 79 See, for example, Eric Moores, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51 
Ariz L Rev 777, 786–90 (2009) (discussing evidence showing the influence of forfeiture laws 
on law enforcement agencies’ behavior). This state of affairs is perhaps not surprising 
given the findings of a recent survey showing that nearly 40 percent of police agencies see 
forfeiture proceeds as necessary to police operations. See Marian R. Williams, et al, Polic-
ing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture 12 (Institute for Justice 2010). See also 
Jefferson E. Holcomb, et al, Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws and Equitable Sharing Activity by 
the Police, 17 Crimin & Pub Pol 101, 112–17 (2018) (providing empirical evidence showing 
state police departments’ strategic use of federal forfeiture laws to maximize their gains). 
 80 For a review of the differences between the various states, see Marian R. Williams, 
Civil Asset Forfeiture: Where Does the Money Go?, 27 Crim Just Rev 321, 323–27 (2002). 
 81 See John L. Worrall and Tomislav V. Kovandzic, Is Policing for Profit? Answers 
from Asset Forfeiture, 7 Crimin & Pub Pol 219, 232–33 (2008) (finding similar rates of 
forfeiture activities across jurisdictions with different allocation rules of forfeiture pro-
ceeds). But see Brent D. Mast, Bruce L. Benson, and David W. Rasmussen, Entrepreneur-
ial Police and Drug Enforcement Policy, 104 Pub Choice 285, 294–98 (2000) (finding 
greater forfeiture activities in jurisdictions that allow police to keep proceeds). Mast,  
Benson, and Rasmussen’s study was limited, however, to drug-related forfeiture activities, 
which makes its analysis vulnerable to a possible substitution effect regarding police en-
forcement of different offences. By contrast, Worrall and Kovandzic’s study examined all 
forfeiture activities. 
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2. Perverse incentives under a liability regime. 
Under a no-liability regime, governmental entities have no 
direct stake in how public services are allocated among potential 
beneficiaries.82 Under a recovery regime, in contrast, this alloca-
tion determines their prospects of collecting compensation.  
Specifically, governmental entities (and officials) increase their 
likelihood of recovery by favoring deep-pocket beneficiaries over 
beneficiaries who are less likely to have the means to pay. As we 
have noted, this is particularly so as insurance policies do not 
cover payments required for services provided by governmental 
agencies.83 These payments often reach thousands of dollars (and 
considerably more in large-scale harm cases), making the pro-
spects of collecting compensation from beneficiaries hinge on 
their individual wealth.84 
Arguably, in those cases in which providers of PGS rescue 
property, favoring rich beneficiaries over poor beneficiaries in-
creases welfare. Regardless of whether this argument is convinc-
ing, the concern we stress here is that the preference to provide 
more services to the rich is independent of the value of the prop-
erty saved. Thus, even if expected harm is the same for both rich 
and poor, the rich will be better served. And even if the expected 
harm of rich beneficiaries is greater, under the view that this 
could be a legitimate concern, the investment in the rich would be 
excessively high: not only would the greater expected harm count 
in determining the allocation between rich and poor beneficiaries, 
but so would the higher likelihood of collecting compensation from 
the rich. 
A similar concern is that given the right to sue negligent ben-
eficiaries, governmental entities might ironically prefer to pro-
vide services to negligent individuals over beneficiaries who took 
proper care, since the former but not the latter would pay for the 
services. Yet this concern is less troubling than the concern re-
garding favoring of the rich. It is much harder for a governmental 
entity, before providing its services, to identify which beneficiar-
ies are negligent. Typically, whether a beneficiary is at fault can 
be verified only after providing the services to her. For this  
 
 82 They might, however, try to save costs by preferring a cheap rescue to a costlier 
one, even if efficiency requires otherwise. 
 83 See text accompanying note 56. 
 84 See, for example, Ed Barnes, Accident Victims Increasingly Being Hit Again—with 
‘Crash Taxes’ (Fox News, Sept 7, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/8UMN-2FQP (“The 
bills can be huge. A simple response to an accident usually costs just less than $500, but 
the bottom line can quickly soar.”). 
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reason, the rest of our analysis is focused on the risk of discrimi-
nating against the poor, rather than against the nonnegligent 
beneficiary. 
Note that as we suggested in the previous Section, studies 
indicate that even if it is the general treasury and not the relevant 
governmental entity that will receive the compensation payment, 
the latter’s incentives to improve the chances of the collection of 
compensation will persist. Arguably, there could be ways to dis-
entangle the incentives to collect damages on the one hand, and 
the incentives to provide PGS on the other; for example, by allow-
ing third parties unrelated to the government—such as nongov-
ernmental funds or charities—to collect damages from negligent 
beneficiaries. However, this approach might result in implemen-
tation difficulties, stemming from the fact that those third parties 
would lack the information necessary to bring suits, while the rel-
evant governmental entity would lack incentives to collect such 
information. In other words, either the governmental entity has 
an interest in the collection of damages, and then has incentives 
to favor the rich; or it has no interest in such collection, and then 
it has no incentives to enable the collection of damages in the first 
place. 
The risk that providers of PGS under a reimbursement re-
gime will discriminate against the poor can manifest in different 
ways. First, when they have to provide PGS simultaneously and 
cannot provide services to all beneficiaries at once, they are likely 
to provide the services to the rich rather than to the poor if they 
are able to distinguish between the two. Second, providers of PGS 
are likely to allocate more resources to the wealthy than to the 
poor, even before the immediate need in PGS arises. For example, 
fire departments would post more trucks to rich neighborhoods 
than to poor ones. Third, since PGS can often be provided in var-
ious qualities, per each case of provision the rich would be pro-
vided with better-quality PGS than the poor. 
The difference in the allocation of PGS under liability and no-
liability regimes also affects beneficiaries’ care incentives. Under 
a no-liability regime, all potential beneficiaries have equal 
chances of benefiting from the public investment in harm preven-
tion (although different expected harms might affect those 
chances). In contrast, under a regime that permits recovery 
claims, deep-pocket beneficiaries have greater chances of receiv-
ing governmental services. Anticipating this, potential beneficiar-
ies with greater resources will reduce their private investment in 
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harm prevention and increase their reliance on public invest-
ment. This is both inefficient and unjust. Example 2, below, illus-
trates why. This example assumes the same facts as Example 1, 
except that Factory A can spray a fire retardant at a cost of 4 
(compared to 7 in Example 1). 
Example 2.  Two factories are operating in the same indus-
trial area. There is a 10 percent annual risk that a fire will break 
out due to natural causes. If this happens and no precautions 
have been taken, each factory will suffer a loss of 100. Factory A 
can spray a fire retardant at an annual cost of 4, which would 
save Factory A from the fire but would not affect the probability 
of its occurrence. Factory B, by contrast, cannot take any efficient 
precautions. If a fire erupts, the local fire station can send its fire 
trucks to put out the fire at a cost of 20. However, the trucks’ wa-
ter tanks are sufficient to save only one of the factories. Factory A 
is a subsidiary of a worldwide chain, while Factory B is a small 
business. 
As in Example 1, social welfare is maximized when Factory A 
takes care and sprays fire retardant and when a fire erupts, the 
local fire force rescues Factory B. Consider first Factory A’s incen-
tives under a regime in which governmental entities cannot claim 
recovery and therefore have no stake in which factory is saved. 
Recall from our analysis of Example 1 that Factory A’s expected 
harm when it takes no care is 5. Because in Example 2 the cost of 
spraying a fire retardant is now only 4, Factory A does not benefit 
from relying on the public investment in harm prevention. Al-
though fire suppression services are free of charge, because they 
are only probabilistically provided, Factory A is better off taking 
precautionary measures at its own private expense. Thus, in con-
trast to Example 1, a no-liability regime yields the efficient outcome. 
But Factory A’s care incentives could change under a regime 
allowing reimbursement claims. Given Factory A’s deep pockets, 
the fire station may prefer to save it, rather than Factory B, in 
the event of fire, even though their expected harms are the same. 
Such a bias would reduce Factory A’s costs of taking no care. In 
the extreme situation in which governmental entities strictly fa-
vor deep-pocket beneficiaries, Factory A would be rescued with 
certainty. Its expected cost of no care in this case would be only 2 
(10% × 20), lower than the cost of spraying a fire retardant. Par-
adoxically, then, a reimbursement regime makes wealthy benefi-
ciaries better off. Although they must now pay to be rescued, the 
increase in the cost of taking no care is more than offset by the 
increase in their likelihood of being rescued. 
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The distortive effect of a reimbursement regime on benefi-
ciaries’ optimal care incentives is not, in fact, contingent on strict 
bias on the part of governmental entities. Even a moderate bias 
in favor of deep-pocket beneficiaries could erode their incentives. 
Suppose, for example, that the prospects of claiming recovery lead 
governmental entities to allocate their services slightly in favor of 
deep-pocket beneficiaries, so that Factory A’s chances of being 
rescued are 80 percent and Factory B’s chances are 20 percent. As 
Table 2 shows, in this case as well, Factory A is incentivized to 
refrain from taking the precautionary measures. 
TABLE 2: FACTORY A’S COSTS 







(10% × 50% × 100) 
3.6 
(10% × 20% × 100) + 
(10% × 80% × 20) 
 
Yet the tendency of governmental entities to save the rich 
might have an upside in some circumstances. Imagine a different 
example, in which (as in Example 2) Factory A has deep pockets 
and Factory B does not. But here, assume (in the converse of Ex-
ample 1) that it is Factory B (the non-deep-pocket beneficiary) ra-
ther than Factory A (the deep-pocket beneficiary) that can take 
care at a cost of 7, while Factory A can do nothing (or its costs of 
care are higher than Factory B’s costs of care). If in the event of a 
fire, the fire station will choose randomly which factory to res-
cue—as is the case under a no-reimbursement regime—Factory B 
will avoid taking care (7 > 5), just as Factory A will opt to not take 
care in the original version of Example 1. However, if instead the 
fire station has a stake in rescuing Factory A (the deep-pocket 
beneficiary)—as is likely to occur under a reimbursement re-
gime—Factory B, realizing in advance that it will not be rescued 
in the event of a fire, will take care measures at a cost of 7, as 
entailed by efficiency.  
Let’s now generalize our claim: a reimbursement regime has 
an inverse effect on beneficiaries’ incentives because it dilutes the 
incentives of rich beneficiaries to take precautions while strength-
ening the care incentives of poor beneficiaries. From an efficiency 
perspective, the implications of this effect depend on the circum-
stances. It is socially desirable when poor beneficiaries are the 
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cheapest cost avoiders (in particular when they would avoid tak-
ing optimal care under a no-reimbursement regime) but ineffi-
cient when rich beneficiaries could prevent harm at the lowest 
cost (in particular when they would take optimal care under a no-
reimbursement regime). 
In sum, as we explained in Part II.A, providing beneficiaries 
with efficient incentives in all circumstances requires charging 
them for the full social costs of their failure to take optimal care, 
including the harm done to others who were deprived of PGS, or 
who received a lower quality PGS, because of the beneficiaries’ 
failure to take proper precautions. Imposing a reimbursement 
duty for only the direct costs of the public services rendered would 
induce beneficiaries to take suboptimal care. Furthermore, any 
liability borne by beneficiaries toward government entities could 
skew the latter’s incentives, encouraging them to provide more, 
or better-quality, services to deep-pocket beneficiaries. Depend-
ing on the circumstances, this could have either desirable or un-
desirable efficiency implications. The question, then, is which le-
gal regime is better: Reimbursement or no-reimbursement of PGS 
costs? Our answer, as we show below, is that the latter regime is 
typically preferable to the former. 
C. Reimbursement Versus No-Reimbursement 
The justification for a no-reimbursement regime rests on both 
efficiency and distributive justice considerations. In a nutshell, 
the efficiency argument is that a significant dilution of the incen-
tives of the wealthy to take care (which is the outcome under a 
reimbursement regime) is more detrimental than a moderate di-
lution of the incentives of everyone to take care (which is the out-
come under a no-reimbursement regime). The distributive justice 
argument is self-evident: a reimbursement regime, which incen-
tivizes governmental entities to provide more and better PGS to 
the wealthy at the expense of the poor, will further disadvantage 
society’s already disadvantaged groups. 
1. Efficiency. 
Examples 1 and 2 and their variations demonstrate that the 
choice between a reimbursement regime and a no-reimbursement 
regime is a choice between creating weak incentives for the 
wealthy alongside strong incentives for the poor to take care, and 
creating moderate incentives for everyone to take care. As we 
have seen, sometimes one set of effects is more desirable than the 
other, and sometimes the opposite is true. 
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But the examples discussed above are binary care cases: each 
factory can take either full care or no care at all. In many real-life 
cases, by contrast, care is a continuum of precautionary choices 
rather than a binary choice.85 Thus, each factory could choose 
from among many levels of precautions (for example, spraying 
cheap, more expensive, or very expensive fire retardants, in-
stalling fire extinguishers of varying quality); each level yields a 
different level of risk reduction. When precautions are on a contin-
uum, efficiency mandates taking care up to the point at which the 
marginal costs of precautions equal the marginal risk reduction.86 
With a continuum of precautions, it would be unlikely for ef-
ficiency to require that some property owners take no precaution 
at all while others take the highest level of precaution. Realisti-
cally, with a continuum of precautions, each property owner 
should take some level of precaution, thereby reducing risks  
but not eliminating them altogether. This entails that all prop-
erty owners are subject to a certain risk of harm. A reimburse-
ment regime, as we have explained, reduces dramatically the  
incentives of the wealthy to take precautions, whereas a no-reim-
bursement regime preserves their incentives, together with the 
poor’s incentives, to take some precautions. Under the latter re-
gime, all property owners know that given the government’s lim-
ited resources, they cannot be certain that it will provide them with 
PGS when needed, and they will therefore all take precautions.87 
Admittedly, as explained, a no-reimbursement regime would 
encourage beneficiaries to ignore the government’s costs of 
providing PGS in conducting their affairs since they would not be 
liable for those costs. Recall that this is the main concern voiced 
by opponents of such a rule. But as we have shown, reimburse-
ment would be insufficient to induce beneficiaries to take optimal 
care. Furthermore, a reimbursement rule would create a substan-
tial risk of discriminatory provision of PGS in favor of the wealthy 
at the expense of the poor. This would be both inefficient and, as 
we explain in the next Section, unjust. 
 
 85 See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 196–97 (cited in note 52) (distinguish-
ing between binary and continuous precautions). 
 86 See id at 200–01 (defining the efficient level of precautions). 
 87 Under standard assumptions, the first dollar invested in precautions produces 
more risk-reduction than the second dollar, and so on. See id at 23 (discussing the idea of 
declining marginal benefits). Therefore, it is better that all residents take some precau-
tions than that some take optimal precautions and others take none at all. 
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2. Distributive justice. 
Under a reimbursement regime, the poor would be forced to 
bear high costs of care. Furthermore, since they would often be 
unable to completely reduce their risks by taking precautions, 
their losses would also be high compared to those incurred by the 
wealthy. 
The tendency of injurers to prefer to inflict harm on poor ra-
ther than wealthy victims and to take lower levels of care toward 
the poor is a notorious and widespread phenomenon.88 It is not 
only, or even primarily, because the wealthy can be expected to 
suffer more severe property damage than the poor, but because 
the wealthy, in the event of bodily injury, can be expected to re-
cover much higher damages for lost wages than the poor. Indeed, 
the fact that damages for bodily injury are largely composed of 
lost wages means that the lives and limbs of the poor are worth 
less than those of the wealthy, at least for injurers.89 
This familiar distributive justice concern is not, however, the 
concern we are analyzing here. Whereas the usual concern relates 
to injurers (defendants) and their choice of victims (plaintiffs),90 
we are considering how the “victim” (the government) strategi-
cally chooses its “injurers” (defendants, who are the property own-
ers in our examples). Note that in both cases, what underlies the 
regressive consequences of the legal rules is the fact that either 
the victim (in the common case) or the injurer (in our case) is poor. 
In our analysis, however, being poor is simply a proxy for a higher 
likelihood of being judgment proof or hard to collect damages 
from. In other words, when all potential beneficiaries are suffi-
ciently rich, the government’s tendency to discriminate among 
them in providing PGS might disappear. In contrast, the inclina-
tion of injurers to impose risks on the poor rather than the rich 
persists as long as there are wage disparities among potential vic-
tims: even when all potential victims are wealthy (high-income 
earners), injurers will prefer to impose risks on the less wealthy 
among them (lower-income earners). 
 
 88 See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L Rev 785, 798–801, 809–10 
(1990) (“[T]ort liability necessarily translates unequal recoveries . . . into unequal expo-
sure to risk. An entrepreneur in a  competitive market must spend less to protect those 
who are less likely to claim or who will recover lower damage awards—poor, unemployed, 
young, old, or inadequately educated individuals,  racial  minorities, noncitizens, and 
women.”). See also Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 Yale L J 82, 97–107 (2011) 
(arguing that since lost income is a major component in damages awards for bodily injury, 
injurers take less care toward the poor). 
 89 See Porat, 121 Yale L J at 97–107 (cited in note 88). 
 90 As well as taking low levels of care toward the poor. 
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Another difference between the two cases relates to the abil-
ity of injurers (in the common case) and victims (in our case) to 
distinguish between the wealthy and the poor. In many accidental 
harm cases, injurers cannot distinguish in advance between the 
rich and the poor and therefore take the same level of care toward 
all victims. In our case, however, governmental entities typically 
have accurate information regarding beneficiaries’ wealth, which 
means that if they want to discriminate against the poor, they are 
very often able to do so. In addition, in our case, as opposed to the 
common case, it is the government that is discriminating amongst 
citizens by depriving the poor of equal protection and assistance. 
This is a far more disturbing discrimination than when individu-
als discriminate through tort law and can be expected to be more 
strongly resisted and condemned by citizens.91 
3. The case of full internalization. 
So far, the analysis has focused on a reimbursement-of-costs 
rule and compared it to a no-liability rule. But as we have already 
mentioned, liability could theoretically be imposed for all (actual) 
social costs, including harms to third parties. While this rule is 
hard to implement in most cases, it is interesting to consider 
whether, and to what extent, the discrimination effect described 
above persists under such a rule. 
If we assume that rich beneficiaries always pay for the full 
social costs of their faulty behavior, then they have adequate in-
centives to take efficient care, and ideally, never to be negligent. 
In contrast, since poor beneficiaries expect to pay less than the 
full social costs—either on account of being judgment proof, or be-
cause they expect underenforcement of the collection of damages 
from them—they may sometimes choose to be negligent. If this is 
so, counterintuitively, governmental entities would prefer to pro-
vide services to the poor rather than to the rich; while from the 
poor they might collect damages (even if not in full), they would 
never collect damages from the rich who (hypothetically) are 
never negligent. While such an outcome has progressive distribu-
tive consequences (the poor are prioritized over the rich), it  
results in inefficiencies; namely, while the rich have strong incen-
tives to take care, the incentives of the poor are weak. The poor 
 
 91 See Guido Calabresi, The Future of Law and Economics 24–29 (Yale 2016) (dis-
cussing the costs borne by citizens when certain resources (“merit goods”) are allocated ac-
cording to the existing wealth distribution in society and labeling them “external moral costs”). 
38 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1 
would not only discount their future damages because of the col-
lection hurdles that the PGS provider would face. They would also 
consume more PGS even when they—and not the rich—are the 
cheapest cost avoiders, and even when their expected harm is 
smaller than that of the rich. 
In reality, rich and poor is not a dichotomy but a spectrum. 
Therefore, among those beneficiaries who are expected to be at 
least sometimes negligent, there are richer and poorer individu-
als. The provider of services might therefore balance its prefer-
ence to provide PGS to those who are more likely to be negligent 
(the poorer) and its preference to provide PGS to those from whom 
collection of damages is easier (the rich). The question of where 
the line would be drawn is context dependent. However, we have 
no reason to assume it would be drawn at the optimal point. 
D. Limitations 
The argument against a reimbursement regime assumed 
that the poor and the wealthy are ex ante distinguishable from 
one another and that wealth is a good proxy for being able to re-
imburse the government for its costs. We further assumed that 
under such a regime, the government tends to prefer the wealthy 
to the poor in rendering its services and that this inefficiently un-
dermines the incentives of the wealthy to take proper care, 
thereby imposing an excessive burden of care and losses on the 
poor. We will now relax these assumptions and see how it affects 
our conclusions. 
1. It is hard to distinguish the rich from the poor. 
While in some circumstances governmental entities might 
easily distinguish the rich from the poor when rendering PGS, in 
other cases, this could be tricky. In the latter instances, the risk 
of discriminating against the poor does not arise under a reim-
bursement regime. To illustrate, a local fire department can typ-
ically tell whether a potential rescuee is rich or poor either in ad-
vance by the location of the residence to where firefighters are 
dispatched or by appearance, at the time of rescue, when the fire-
fighters arrive and see the rescuee’s home. The former indicator 
of wealth is a more effective mechanism for discriminating than 
the latter under a reimbursement regime, for when a neighbor-
hood is a good proxy for the wealth of its residents, fire depart-
ments might allocate more resources to wealthier neighborhoods. 
In contrast, discrimination is less likely to be based on what fire-
fighters see when they arrive at the site of the fire; they can be 
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less expected to deliberately prefer assisting the wealthy simply 
because the wealthy are more likely to be able to pay them com-
pensation in the event of injury (although this is not a completely 
implausible scenario).92 Firefighters might, however, be less in-
clined to assist a poor victim when it is only the victim’s property 
that is at risk of harm. Anticipating the possibility of severe phys-
ical injuries, firefighters may be particularly reluctant to take 
risks to extinguish a fire that threatens property alone if the own-
ers are incapable of compensating them for their harm.93 
The same distinction applies to emergency roadside assis-
tance services, such as providing first aid to victims of car  
accidents. Under a reimbursement regime, public authorities 
might allocate such resources more generously to wealthy neigh-
borhoods, assuming this to be a good proxy for the wealth of the 
potential victims. If, however, this is not a good proxy, discrimi-
nation becomes a low risk. 
Public hospitals are another possible example of this phe-
nomenon. Hospital administrators are often well aware of pa-
tients’ ability or inability to pay for medical services.94 Responding 
to needs of finding additional sources of income, hospitals increas-
ingly engage in practices aimed at identifying wealthy patients 
 
 92 For extreme examples in which firefighters refused to assist residents after dis-
covering that the latter hadn’t paid their firefighting subscription fees (fees paid by resi-
dents of remote areas to nearby municipalities for firefighting services), see Meena 
Hartenstein, Firefighters Let House Burn in Rural Tennessee Because Homeowner Didn’t 
Pay $75 Fee (NY Daily News, Oct 6, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/R8E2-6YG3; Fire-
fighters Let Home Burn After Owners Didn’t Pay $75 Protection Fee—Again (US News, 
Dec 7, 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/H8XV-E4WM. For a similar case involving a 
refusal to provide police services to a town due to an unpaid debt to the sheriff’s office, see 
No Pay, No Police (NBC Chicago, Oct 5, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/K2PK-KGWE. 
 93 Although public officials are covered by workers’ compensation, the coverage is 
limited. See Dobbs, Law of Torts at § 503 (cited in note 38) (describing the architecture of 
workers’ compensation, including employers’ limited liability). Suing negligent property 
owners would thus allow public officials to collect full compensation for their harm. 
 94 See Lewis R. Goldfrank, The Public Hospital, 24 Fordham Urban L J 703, 707 
(1997) (“All other hospital departments [except the emergency department] permit dis-
crimination by payer class; diversion, delay, and denial of care for those with marginal 
finances is legally acceptable.”); David A. Ansell and Robert L. Schiff, Patient Dumping: 
Status, Implications, and Policy Recommendations, 257 JAMA 1500, 1501 (1987) (report-
ing a Chicago hospital’s practice of placing a yellow sticker on the charts of patients who 
are not covered by private insurance or Medicaid as a reminder to avoid admitting them). 
Despite efforts to combat discrimination against indigent patients, “dumping” and other 
discriminatory practices still occur in hospitals. See generally, for example, Will Jay 
Pirkey, A Shameful Practice: Despite Enactment of the Emergency Medical Treatment & 
Active Labor Act in 1986, Violations of Patient Dumping Continue to Represent a Serious 
Hazard in the City of Los Angeles, 39 LA Law 20 (2016) (discussing recent cases of dumping 
of indigent patients in Los Angeles). See also text accompanying notes 147–49. 
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and providing them with better-quality services.95 Under a PGS 
reimbursement regime, they might find ways to admit patients 
who are better able to pay for their medical bills. In some cases, 
the potential (ultimate) payees of the hospital bills are the wrong-
doers who cause injury to the patients.96 Hospitals might thus 
tend to admit patients whose injuries were caused by deep-pocket 
wrongdoers (such as tobacco companies or drug manufacturers) 
more than patients injured by less wealthy wrongdoers or due to 
nonwrongful causes.97 
2. No risk of undercompensation and availability of 
insurance. 
Under a reimbursement regime, the government’s motivation 
to discriminate against the poor in providing PGS arises only 
when there is a difference in the relative ability of the poor and 
the wealthy to reimburse the governmental entity for its costs. 
Consequently, if all potential PGS beneficiaries have enough  
resources to cover those costs, it makes no difference to the gov-
ernmental entity who is richer and who is poorer: so long as there 
is no risk of undercompensation, the service provider can be ex-
pected to ignore the wealth of the individuals in need of PGS. 
Ironically, when all individuals are too poor, the governmental 
entity will also not be inclined to discriminate in providing PGS. 
 
 95 See, for example, Is There Harm in Hospitals Targeting Rich Patients for Dona-
tions? (NBC News, June 28, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/7HXH-8XZN (describing 
nonprofit hospitals’ contracting with market data firms to screen patients’ wealth to gauge 
their propensity to donate); Shoa L. Clarke, How Hospitals Coddle the Rich (NY Times, 
Oct 26, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/JSW4-87CC (criticizing hospitals’ practices of 
“marking” wealthy patients—for example by giving them blankets with a unique color—
and providing them with better-quality services as a strategy for raising revenues). 
 96 Although hospitals cannot sue injurers, nearly all states allow them to place a lien 
on any recovery amounts patients may receive from third parties that caused the patients’ 
injuries. Admitting patients who were injured by deep-pocket injurers can, therefore, en-
sure hospitals’ recovery of their costs. See generally Alaina N. Stout, Statutory Liens for 
Health Care Providers: The Effectiveness of Laws Allowing Providers to Assert Liens on 
Settlements or Judgments from Third Party Tortfeasors, 18 Health L 10 (2006) (analyzing 
state statutes). Whether hospitals benefit from applying such a strategy depends on their 
ability to predetermine injurers’ wealth. While hospitals might find it hard to uncover 
such information, they can approach third parties that would conduct this inquiry. As 
noted, hospitals already contract with data firms to find similar information about patients. 
 97 However, at times, deep-pocket wrongdoers can be stubborn litigants. See Robert 
L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DePaul L Rev 331, 357 (2001) 
(“For four decades, Big Tobacco used its enormous resources to beat down every effort by 
litigants to secure compensation.”). 
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If all or most individuals are insured against risks prevented 
or mitigated through PGS, and the insurance policies cover reim-
bursement costs, then the risk of discriminating against the poor 
again diminishes. As noted above, existing insurance policies usu-
ally do not cover payments required by governmental entities.98 
But suppose that insurance policies covering such payments were 
offered in the market. Would poor beneficiaries buy them?  
Arguably yes, since such coverage would increase their chances 
to be served by the relevant governmental entities. But such an 
effect would only materialize if, before the PGS is provided, they 
could signal to the providers of the PGS that they have such in-
surance—which typically would be hard to do. Therefore, we ex-
pect that many poor beneficiaries would not buy insurance even 
if it were offered in the market. They would find it more profitable 
to avoid insurance premiums, hoping not to bear the full costs of 
PGS if provided to them. This raises the question of whether man-
datory insurance could be a solution to the discrimination prob-
lem. The next Section discusses this possibility.99 
3. Cases in which the government cannot discriminate in 
providing PGS. 
With certain PGS activities, there is less of a likelihood that 
the government will discriminate between the wealthy and the 
poor. For example, it is unlikely that park rangers will discrimi-
nate between wealthy and poor hikers who have gotten lost when 
the rescue efforts are sequential—that is, undertaken whenever 
the need arises—as opposed to simultaneous efforts, when dis-
crimination is a possibility.100 To the extent that the rangers 
themselves can distinguish between hikers, a reimbursement  
regime could affect their incentives given that the wealthier hik-
ers would more likely be able to compensate the rangers in the 
event of their injury during a rescue operation. As in the case of 
firefighters, when a hiker’s life is at risk, it seems unlikely that 
 
 98 See text accompanying note 56. Note that with insurance, citizens will still have 
incentives to reduce risks since in a competitive insurance market, premiums are respon-
sive to risk reduction by the insured. See Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D. Logue, Outsourc-
ing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 Mich L Rev 197, 205–08 (2012) 
(explaining how adjusting premiums incentivizes the insured to take care). 
 99 See text accompanying notes 123–24. 
 100 However, even with sequential rescues, discrimination is possible. For example, if 
the rangers know that the hiker is wealthy, they might use a helicopter to evacuate him, 
but if he is poor, only an ambulance. In addition, the park authorities might invest more 
equipment and manpower in rescue efforts where wealthier hikers tend to travel than the 
areas the less wealthy frequent. 
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rangers will be influenced by the hiker’s wealth in carrying out 
their assistance efforts. When the urgency of the rescue is less 
severe, however, financial considerations might play a greater 
role and impact the level of risk rangers take. 
In other situations, there might be supervision of how the  
relevant governmental entity allocates its services. When the  
governmental activities are transparent and subject to public or 
judicial scrutiny, the risk of discrimination in providing the PGS 
diminishes. 
4. Other potential limitations. 
While we argue that providers of PGS might discriminate 
against the poor since they expect to collect more damages from 
the rich, a counterargument might be that collection from the rich 
is sometimes harder than from the poor because the former are 
more capable of defending themselves in lawsuits.101 If this is so, 
it is hard—if not impossible—to tell whether the providers of PGS 
would be better off with a suit for recovery against the rich or the 
poor. While this argument might be right in some contexts, it is 
wrong in others. Legal proceedings to recover for PGS are often 
simple and straightforward, and the rich have no clear advantage 
over the poor in defending themselves in such proceedings. More-
over, as we have shown, it is precisely because the rich are more 
likely to pay that governmental entities favor them over poor ben-
eficiaries. A rich beneficiary would thus prefer to avoid a reputa-
tion of being someone who escapes reimbursing the government. 
Such a reputation would reduce her chances of receiving govern-
mental services in the future. 
A second argument, from the opposite direction, is that the 
new reason for discrimination in providing PGS that this Article 
exposes contributes only marginally to the overall discrimination 
against the poor in providing those services. We believe there is 
no reason to assume that a rule imposing liability for reimburse-
ment of costs adds to existing discrimination only marginally. On 
the contrary, if such discrimination takes place regardless of the 
liability rule, legislatures and courts should be extra cautious not 
to adopt legal rules that provide even stronger incentives to the 
government to discriminate against the poor. 
 
 101 See text accompanying note 97. 
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E. Summary 
We have developed two central claims in this Part of the Ar-
ticle. First, even if we assume that PGS are provided on a nondis-
criminatory basis, requiring negligent beneficiaries to reimburse 
the governmental service provider for its direct costs does not in-
centivize them to take optimal care. We have demonstrated that 
such an incentive would also be produced if negligent beneficiar-
ies were made to internalize the entirety of the social harm caused 
by their failure to take care, including the harm to third parties 
who were deprived of or received inferior PGS as a result of the 
beneficiaries’ consumption of those services. Second, we claimed 
that under a reimbursement regime, there would be a likelihood 
that PGS would often be provided discriminatorily, whereby the 
wealthy would receive these services even when they are the 
cheapest cost avoiders, while the poor would not receive PGS even 
when the governmental entity is the cheapest cost avoider. 
Our tentative conclusion is that with certain exceptions, it 
would be desirable to retain the common law rules and not allow 
governmental entities and officials to recover their PGS costs.  
Although these rules are not socially optimal, their outcomes are 
more efficient and just than those yielded by a reimbursement 
regime. In the next Part, we develop other solutions, which are 
often preferable to both the no-liability and reimbursement-of-
cost rules. 
III.  OTHER SOLUTIONS 
This Part will develop four liability rules, including the  
already-discussed ex post internalization rule, each with its own 
information requirements and enforcement costs. These rules  
create efficient incentives for potential beneficiaries to take care 
while contending with the concern about fair allocation of PGS. 
Each rule has unique advantages in certain circumstances, and 
our policy recommendation is, therefore, that each rule be applied 
in the appropriate category of cases. We first present the four 
rules and then compare their relative advantages. 
A. Four Liability Rules 
1. Ex post internalization. 
The ex post internalization rule is the most common rule in 
tort law. This rule imposes liability on the negligent injurer for all 
foreseeable harms caused by his negligent behavior and thereby 
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forces him to internalize those harms.102 Under the Hand formula, 
which is often applied by courts to define negligence, the injurer is 
negligent when the costs of precautions (B) he failed to take would 
have been lower than the expected harm (PL, where P stands for 
the probability of harm and L for its magnitude) that those pre-
cautions would have prevented.103 The ex post internalization lia-
bility rule creates efficient incentives for injurers to take care.104 
To apply the ex post internalization rule, courts need rough 
estimates about available precautions (B), the probability that the 
harm would materialize (P), and relatively accurate information 
about the size of the harm (L). To determine the injurer’s liability, 
the court compares the estimated B and PL (the expected harm). 
If B is lower than PL, the injurer’s negligence is established, and 
the court then determines the damages to be awarded to the plain-
tiff according to the actual harm (L). If we apply this rule to PGS 
cases, a negligent PGS beneficiary will bear liability for the en-
tirety of the social harm caused by his failure to take care. 
It would not necessarily be difficult for courts to estimate 
whether the beneficiary was negligent because such an assess-
ment only requires that the court know whether, in Hand  
Formula terms, B < PL. To illustrate, in District of Columbia v 
Air Florida, Inc,105 a leading PGS case, the defendant-airline was 
sued by the plaintiff for various public expenditures it had in-
curred following the crash of the defendant’s aircraft.106 The crash 
may have been caused by the airline’s failure to adequately de-ice 
 
 102 However, certain types of harms are not compensated and certain types of plain-
tiffs cannot recover for reasons related to proximate cause or duty of care that mandate no 
compensation. See Restatement (Third) of Torts §§ 7, 29 (2010). 
 103 The Hand formula was first articulated in United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 
F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947), and later adopted by the courts as well as the Restatement of 
Torts. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm § 3, 
cmt e (2010) (suggesting that negligence can be ascertained by a “risk-benefit test,” where 
the benefit is the advantage that the actor gains if she refrains from taking precautions, 
which is a balancing approach that is substantially similar to the Hand formula); Richard 
Epstein, Torts 129 (Aspen 1999) (“In . . . appellate discussions, the modern tendency is to 
resort quickly to the general cost-benefit Hand formula.”). 
 104 More accurately, they take precautions up to the point where marginal costs equal 
marginal expected harm. See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 200–01, 205–07 
(cited in note 52). 
 105 750 F2d 1077 (DC Cir 1984). 
 106 Id at 1078. The claim against the airline for recovery of the costs of rescue services 
was dismissed. Id at 1086. 
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the wings of the airplane before takeoff, which was clearly re-
quired in light of the harsh weather conditions.107 Thus, the de-
fendant’s negligence was evident. In other cases, regulators could 
set standards of care for potential beneficiaries,108 and a failure to 
comply with those standards would constitute negligence per se. 
The main informational problem, however, would be the esti-
mation of the harm actually caused to third parties by the bene-
ficiary’s suboptimal care. As we have already explained, it is hard 
to imagine that private individuals would be able to sue for such 
harms; courts would likely deem the harms too remote and diffi-
cult to trace back to any particular beneficiary’s insufficient 
care.109 The same barriers would arise if plaintiffs were govern-
mental entities (assuming they could bring such claims on behalf 
of the public).110 A possible solution to this is for regulators to set 
the average social harm caused by negligent PGS beneficiaries for 
predefined circumstances and impose liability accordingly.111 
Let us now assume that implementing the ex post internali-
zation rule is feasible. But is it desirable? This is where the risk 
of discrimination amongst individuals requiring PGS based on 
wealth arises. Full internalization distorts the governmental in-
centives to provide PGS.112 Note that due to a “feedback-loop”  
effect, even modest governmental discrimination might have sub-
stantial impact. A marginal transfer of resources from PGS pro-
viders in poor neighborhoods to PGS providers in rich neighbor-
hoods will result in a marginal increase in the difference in 
property prices between rich and poor neighborhoods. This will 
result in a marginal increase in neighborhood segregation by 
 
 107 National Transportation Safety Board, Aircraft Accident Report *57–58 (Jan 13, 
1982), archived at https://perma.cc/3B7Q-6Y8B (discussing improper de-icing procedures 
on Air Florida Flight 90, but withholding judgment as to whether this caused the crash). 
 108 See, for example, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-596, 
84 Stat 1590, codified at 29 USC §§ 651 et seq (setting general standards for workplace 
safety); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 CFR § 571.101–571.500 (2011) (set-
ting safety standards for automobiles); Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), 14 CFR § 91 
(1989) (prescribing detailed requirements for aviators, aircraft manufacturers, repair sta-
tions, and others involved in air carriage and general aviation). 
 109 See Part II.A.2.e. 
 110 Several federal environmental statutes, for example, allow appointed governmen-
tal entities to act on behalf of the public as trustees of the natural resources. The trustees 
are authorized to sue on behalf of the public, to collect compensation from responsible 
parties, and to oversee the process of repairing damaged natural resources. See, for exam-
ple, CERCLA, 42 USC § 9607(f); Clean Water Act, 33 USC § 1321(f)(5); Oil Pollution Act, 
33 USC § 2706(b)–(c). 
 111 See Part II.A.2.d. Statutorily fixed-amount damages already exist in other con-
texts, for example, with respect to copyright infringements. See 17 USC §§ 412, 504(c)(1). 
 112 See Part II.C.3. 
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wealth, which will, in turn, result in a marginal increase in the 
government’s incentive to transfer additional resources from PGS 
providers in poor neighborhoods to PGS providers in rich neigh-
borhoods, and so on. Consequently, rich beneficiaries’ incentives 
to take care might be significantly eroded. 
2. Ex post disgorgement. 
Under the ex post disgorgement rule,113 the negligent injurer 
is liable in the amount of the efficient precautions he failed to 
take, divided by the probability of injury being caused by this 
omission. In the Hand formula’s terms, under this rule, the neg-
ligent injurer’s liability is B/P. Since this rule imposes the mini-
mum ex post liability necessary for deterrence, it is sensitive to 
the problem of underenforcement: enforcement that is even 
slightly lower than 100 percent would not provide injurers with 
sufficient incentives to take care. Thus, to contend with this real-
ity, liability should be raised to attain the desired deterrent effect. 
Let’s consider how such a liability rule could be applied to 
PGS cases and its potential advantages over the ex post internal-
ization rule. Under this rule, a PGS beneficiary who took insuffi-
cient care should be liable not for the harm suffered by third par-
ties or for the costs borne by the PGS provider, but for her 
untaken precautions divided by the probability that the PGS 
would be provided to her. Thus, if a property owner failed to take 
precautions of $100 to prevent a fire in her house and there was 
a 1 percent probability of a fire breaking out that would require 
PGS, her liability, in the event of a fire, would be $100 / 0.01 = 
$10,000. This is the case even if the harm to third parties (who 
were deprived of PGS because of the property owner’s failure to 
take care) is, say, $1 million.114 As noted, if enforcement of liability 
is less than 100 percent, liability should be adjusted to above 
$10,000. Yet in many PGS cases, enforcement can be expected to 
be close to 100 percent because the governmental entities know 
the beneficiaries’ identity and can claim compensation. 
There is a twofold advantage to the ex post disgorgement 
rule. First, in contrast to the ex post internalization rule, its ap-
plication does not require the availability of accurate information 
 
 113 See generally Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Disgorgement Damages for Accidents, 
44 J Legal Stud 249 (2015) (developing and analyzing this rule). 
 114 In this example, we assume that in the event of a fire, the beneficiary would be 
rescued with certainty. If the probability of rescue is less than 100 percent, liability under 
the ex post disgorgement rule could be reduced to account for the beneficiary’s self-risk. 
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as to the harm caused to third parties (L). Rather, it requires in-
formation about the magnitude of untaken precautions (B)115 and 
about the probability (P) that PGS will be provided.116 When this 
information is available, which is typical of many situations, ap-
plying the ex post disgorgement rule might be a far more realistic 
option in practice than applying the ex post internalization rule. 
Second, the ex post disgorgement rule would usually result 
in lower, sometimes much lower, damages to be paid to the gov-
ernmental entity than the ex post internalization rule.117 To illus-
trate with our numerical example, liability under the disgorge-
ment rule would yield $10,000 in damages whereas the 
internalization rule would yield $1 million! Moreover, liability un-
der the ex post disgorgement rule would often yield lower dam-
ages than the damages the negligent beneficiary would be liable 
for under the (much-endorsed) rule of reimbursement of costs. 
This is an advantage of the utmost importance because in many 
circumstances, it might outweigh the concern that liability would 
induce governmental entities to discriminate against the poor. 
Liability of $10,000 rather than $1 million or even $100,000 
would mean that many more property owners would be able to 
cover their liability. This would dramatically diminish govern-
mental entities’ incentive to discriminate in providing PGS.118 
3. Ex ante internalization and mandatory insurance. 
A third rule that could be applicable in PGS situations is ex 
ante internalization. This rule imposes liability on injurers for the 
wrongful risk they create regardless of whether harm material-
ized or not. The amount of their liability is the expected harm that 
they negligently failed to reduce (PL). 119 
 
 115 However, to know the exact measure of B when it is continuous, we need to know PL. 
 116 The court would also need to roughly estimate PL in order to determine whether 
the PGS beneficiary was negligent (that is, whether B < PL). 
 117 Note that damages under the disgorgement rule will be equal to or less than dam-
ages under the internalization rule even if B is continuous. See Cooter and Porat, 44 J 
Legal Stud at 256–64 (cited in note 113). 
 118 Note that all beneficiaries who expect to bear liability under this rule will take 
efficient care, and eventually PGS will be provided either to those for whom taking care 
(or taking more care) is inefficient or to those who expect not to bear liability (in full or in 
part) for PGS. 
 119 For a detailed discussion regarding risk-based liability, see Ariel Porat and Alex 
Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty 120–29 (Oxford 2001); Christopher H. Schroeder, 
Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L Rev 439, 462–69 (1990); 
Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA 
L Rev 143, 152–60 (1990). 
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This rule resembles a Pigouvian tax rule rather than tort  
liability.120 It is rarely applied because its costs of enforcement are 
usually prohibitively high, requiring the imposition of liability 
whenever the injurer negligently creates a risk. In order to apply 
the rule, courts must be able to estimate the magnitude of PL. 
Could this rule be applied to PGS cases? Sometimes yes. What 
is typical of many PGS cases is that precautions need to be taken 
just a few times and sometimes only once.121 In such circum-
stances, enforcement costs would not be prohibitively high. As-
suming information about the magnitude of the risk is available, 
the ex ante internalization rule could be optimal in these cases. To 
illustrate, imagine that a property owner failed to spend $100 on 
annual precautionary measures against fire, thereby exposing 
others to 1 percent probability of suffering $1 million in harm. If 
the property owner bears liability of 0.01 × $1 million = $10,000, 
she will internalize the risk created by her negligence and have 
the exact same incentives as the ex post internalization rule to 
take care. Note that even if enforcement is less than 100 percent, 
as long as it is higher than 1 percent, the property owner in our 
example will take efficient precautions of $100 (1% × $10,000). 
This ex ante rule has two important advantages over its ex 
post counterpart. First, many property owners would be able to 
bear the typically low ex ante liability it would impose. Second 
and more importantly, under this rule, there would be no discrim-
ination whatsoever in the allocation of public resources, since 
beneficiaries would bear no liability following the provision of the 
PGS.122 The main concern this rule raises, however, is that once 
liability is imposed ex ante, beneficiaries have no further incen-
tive to take care when necessary, knowing that PGS will be pro-
vided to them at no additional cost. This concern is less troubling 
 
 120 See Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U Pa 
L Rev 93, 100–04 (2015) (discussing the economics of Pigouvian taxes). 
 121 In other cases, the failure to take precautions could be the result of a lapse of at-
tention. See Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Getting Incentives Right—Improving Torts, 
Contracts, and Restitution 61–66 (Princeton 2014) (explaining that many accidents are 
caused by lapses of attention and suggesting how to legally handle them). In such in-
stances, ex post disgorgement might be the best rule. See text accompanying notes 139–40. 
 122 Another advantage of the ex ante rule over its ex post counterpart is that it might 
have a stronger deterrent effect. Individuals tend to respond more strongly to an increase 
in the likelihood of being sanctioned than to a corresponding rise in the level of sanction. 
Since ex ante rules are more likely to be enforced (because they don’t depend upon harm 
occurrence), they impose more certain sanctions than the ex post rules. See Daniel S. 
Nagin and Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction 
Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 Crimin 865, 883–84 
(2001) (finding that the certainty of punishment is more deterring than the severity of the 
punishment). 
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when, after precautions have been taken and liability imposed, 
there is no further need for costly precautions. 
A different version of the ex ante internalization rule, with 
similar incentivizing effects, would be mandatory insurance. Un-
der such a regime, while liability would be imposed ex post for the 
full social harm caused by the PGS beneficiaries’ negligence, com-
pensation would actually be paid by insurance companies. Bene-
ficiaries, in turn, would have to pay the insurance companies pre-
miums in correlation with their expected liability. The insurance 
companies would then have incentive to monitor beneficiaries to 
determine whether they are taking adequate precautions and 
would adjust insurance premiums accordingly.123 Note, however, 
that under this legal regime, courts should be able to verify the 
actual social harm caused by a beneficiary’s failure to take care, 
which is often difficult to do.124 One option could be to institute 
mandatory insurance only for actual PGS expenditures. Although 
beneficiaries’ incentives would not be optimal, as we have shown 
in Part II.A, such a regime might be better than no-liability or  
ex post liability (with no mandatory insurance). 
4. Ex ante disgorgement. 
Finally, disgorgement remedies could also be applied ex ante 
rather than ex post. Under current unjust enrichment law, 
wrongdoers are obliged to disgorge their profits from intentional 
wrongdoing if those profits have been gained at the plaintiff’s ex-
pense, even if she suffered no harm.125 It would be only one step 
further to allow the victims in our case, governmental entities, to 
recover damages from PGS beneficiaries in the amount of their 
untaken precautions when the latter’s negligence exposed third 
parties to a risk of harm.126 There is, however, one important lim-
itation to the ex ante disgorgement rule: as with ex ante internal-
ization, enforcement costs could be prohibitively high since the 
rule requires the imposition of liability whenever an injurer be-
haves negligently, regardless of whether any harm materialized. 
 
 123 See text accompanying note 98. 
 124 See text accompanying note 109. 
 125 See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 44(1) (2011) (“A 
person who obtains a benefit by conscious interference with a claimant’s legally protected 
interests . . . is liable in restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, unless com-
peting legal objectives make such liability inappropriate.”). 
 126 But see Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials 598–
99 (Aspen 3d ed 2002) (“Negligence rarely produces profits, and when it does, the law does 
not seem to think that negligence is sufficiently wrongful to require disgorgement of those 
profits.”). 
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Nevertheless, ex ante disgorgement could still be a plausible 
solution for certain PGS cases. As we have explained above,127 in 
many cases involving the provision of PGS, potential beneficiaries 
need to take precautions just once or only a few times. In such 
cases, enforcement costs will likely be reasonable, although the 
concern regarding imperfect enforcement arises. Thus, if the level 
of enforcement is lower than 100 percent, liability should be in-
creased to compensate for underenforcement. While underenforce-
ment is less troubling with the ex post disgorgement rule (the gov-
ernmental entity knows to whom it provided PGS), it should be 
taken into more serious account with ex ante disgorgement. 
If we return to the example of the property owner who failed 
to take precautions of $100 against fire, thereby creating a risk to 
others of $1 million, under the ex ante disgorgement rule, she 
would be liable for only $100 (or slightly more). Just like the ex 
post disgorgement rule, this liability rule yields the minimal de-
terrence necessary for inducing optimal care.128 The only infor-
mation necessary to apply this rule is the cost of untaken precau-
tions (B). There is no need to know the probability of fire and 
rescue (P) or the potential loss (L), but only their rough estimates, 
in order to determine whether a property owner was negligent.129 
If we assume that the level of enforcement is less than 100 per-
cent—say, 80 percent—liability should be adjusted to $125 (or a 
bit more) to maintain the property owner’s optimal incentives 
(100 / 0.8 = 125). 
The ex ante disgorgement rule has similar advantages to 
those of the ex ante internalization rule. First, under this rule, 
damages would often be low, meaning that most people would be 
able to pay out their liability for negligent behavior. This would 
ensure that potential beneficiaries have efficient incentives to 
take precautions in the first place. Second, governmental entities 
would not discriminate among beneficiaries because there would 
be no liability following the provision of PGS. 
 
 127 See text accompanying note 121. 
 128 We assume that the beneficiary bears no self-risk of not being rescued. Otherwise, 
liability could be further reduced to account for that self-risk. See note 114 and accompa-
nying text. 
 129 But to know the exact measure of B when it is continuous, we need to know PL. 
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* * * 
In practice, while ex post liability is the more common tort 
rule,130 ex ante liability is also adopted by lawmakers. One exam-
ple is the Colorado statute that grants tax benefits to property 
owners who invest in “wildfire mitigation measures.”131 Although 
framed as a tax benefit, this arrangement in effect raises the costs 
for property owners whose faulty behavior increases the risk of 
fire. Consistent with our analysis, the tax benefits are mostly for 
expenses related to safety measures that require a one-time 
(yearly) investment, such as the “establishment of fuel breaks” 
and creation of “defensible space around structures,” and thus in-
volve low enforcement costs.132 Whether this legislation should be 
characterized as ex ante internalization or ex ante disgorgement 
depends on whether the rate of the tax benefits corresponds to the 
consequential reduction in the expected harm (internalization) or 
to property owners’ cost of care (disgorgement). The legislation’s 
central feature is that it renders negligent property owners liable 
irrespective of whether fire erupts and PGS are provided. Using 
such ex ante rules, as noted, enables the legislator to set liability 
at the lowest level that will still create efficient incentives for po-
tential beneficiaries to take care. Furthermore, as we have shown, 
such incentive schemes eliminate the risk of discriminatory  
allocation of PGS by governmental agencies. 
 The table below summarizes the differences among the four 
rules and highlights their relative advantages.133 
  
 
 130 See text accompanying notes 102–03. 
 131 Colo Rev Stat § 39-22-104(4)(n5)(I)(A). See also Colorado Department of Revenue, 
Income 65: Wildlife Mitigation Measures Subtraction, archived at https://perma.cc/2BCA 
-3JSH (public notice of benefits available under the statute). 
 132 Colo Rev Stat § 39-22-104(4)(n5)(III)(D). 
 133 Omitted from the table are the two regimes that were discussed in Part II, namely, 
the rules of “no-liability” and “reimbursement-of-costs.” As noted, these regimes suffer 
from major problems: “no-liability” subsidizes negligent behavior; “reimbursement-of-
costs” induces governmental discrimination while failing to ensure full internalization by 
injurers. These problems are eliminated or substantially attenuated under the remaining 
four rules. 
52 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1 
TABLE 3: SUMMARY 














L B/P PL B 
Information 
costs 
highest moderate moderate lowest 
Amount of 
damages 
highest high low lowest 
Incentivizes 
discrimination 
more less no no 
Enforcement 
costs 
low low high high 
 
The next Section examines how these rules can be applied to 
some common categories of PGS. 
B. Applications 
This Section illustrates how the four liability rules we have 
discussed could be applied to common types of PGS. To avoid rep-
etition, we will not consider again firefighting services. As our 
analysis has implied, with fire departments, ex ante rules—pri-
marily the ex ante disgorgement rule—might be preferable to any 
of the ex post rules.134 
1. Police services. 
Consider the following example: 
Example 3.  A resident fails to take reasonable precautions to 
protect her home from burglars, and eventually a break-in takes 
place. Police officers arrive in time to stop the burglary, and the 
resident suffers no harm. Unfortunately, two police officers are 
injured during the operation. Moreover, the police department 
also suffers property damage and economic losses. Should the res-
ident be liable for the harm to the police officers and police de-
partment and, if so, in what amount? 
 
 134 However, if the beneficiary’s fault is the result of a lapse of attention, the ex post 
disgorgement rule might be preferable. See text accompanying notes 139–40. 
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In most jurisdictions, there is no liability in cases represented 
by Example 3.135 Although the risk of discriminatory treatment by 
the police implies that no-liability is better than liability for ac-
tual costs or for the entire social harm (the reimbursement of 
costs and ex post internalization rules, respectively), the ex post 
disgorgement rule could be the best solution in such circum-
stances. Under this latter rule, the resident would be liable for 
his untaken precautions, say, for failing to install a better lock on 
the windows at a cost of $50 divided by the probability of a  
burglary, say, 0.01, for a total of $5,000.136 Alternatively, if ex post 
disgorgement yields liability that is beyond the means of many 
residents, one of the ex ante rules could be considered. Ex ante 
internalization would impose liability for the expected social 
harm of burglary, which could be hard to measure, whereas ex 
ante disgorgement (with appropriate adjustment to compensate 
for underenforcement137) could be much easier to implement.138 
But ex ante rules cannot be applied in all police services 
cases. Suppose that in Example 3, the need for police assistance 
arises not as the result of an intentional failure to take precau-
tions but rather due to the owner’s inadvertent failure to take 
precautions or a lapse of attention. In such cases, precautions 
would typically be low in cost, and ex ante liability is usually not 
a realistic solution. Liability would usually amount to only a few 
dollars; the costs of enforcing the liability would exceed the 
amount of the liability itself;139 and the threat of bearing liability 
of a few dollars would hardly affect beneficiaries’ level of attention 
lapses.140 Conversely, the ex post internalization rule, which could 
 
 135 See Lytton, 76 Tulane L Rev at 770–71 (cited in note 9) (explaining that under 
current law, most types of law enforcement expenditures are unrecoverable). Neverthe-
less, some statutes now permit such recovery in specific circumstances. See, for example, 
State v Lewis, 711 A2d 669, 673–74 (Vt 1998) (requiring the defendant, who had been 
convicted of escape, to reimburse the Department of Corrections for extradition expenses); 
State v Dillon, 637 P2d 602, 608–09 (Or 1981) (ordering the defendant to pay restitution 
to the local police department for damages to a patrol car caused during a car chase); State 
v Hernandez, 822 P2d 1011, 1013–14 (Idaho App 1991) (ordering the defendant to  
reimburse law enforcement agencies for the amount expended to investigate his narcotics 
violations). 
 136 Regarding the possible relevance of an owner’s self-risk, see note 114. 
 137 See Part III.A.2 and text accompanying notes 120, 121, 129. 
 138 The ex ante rules also require that the police charge negligent residents irrespec-
tive of whether a burglary occurred. 
 139 But that by itself is not necessarily a good reason for the police not to enforce the 
law: in their enforcement decisions the police are expected to consider not only the pay-
ments they collect ex ante but also (at least) the costs they save ex post once citizens are 
efficiently incentivized to take precautions. 
 140 See Cooter and Porat, Getting Incentives Right at 61–66 (cited in note 121) (dis-
cussing lapses of attention as primary causes of accidents). 
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affect beneficiaries’ level of lapses, could also result in discrimi-
natory treatment by the police. The latter risk would be less acute 
with ex post disgorgement: since in cases of lapses of attention 
the costs of care are typically low (relative to the expected harm), 
ex post disgorgement would result in much lower liability than ex 
post internalization. At the same time, the ex post disgorgement 
rule would yield much higher damages than the ex ante disgorge-
ment rule, and therefore enforcement costs would often be low 
enough to justify its application. 
Thus, if a homeowner inadvertently leaves his front door un-
locked, thereby “inviting” a burglar in, the costs of care would be 
very low and the probability of burglary quite high. Therefore, the 
B/P would yield a modest amount (but not below enforcement 
costs) that almost anyone could pay. Under such circumstances, 
the risk of discriminatory allocation of police assistance would be 
minor, and liability might positively affect individuals’ attention-
lapse levels. 
2. Park rangers and rescue squads. 
Consider the following example: 
Example 4.  A hiker in the Grand Canyon negligently loses 
his way. Park rangers rescue him using a helicopter. The costs of 
rescue amount to $100,000. Should the hiker bear these costs or 
pay any other amount to the park rangers? 
In this example, ex post internalization or even simple reim-
bursement of costs might be more than what the average hiker 
can afford. Therefore, with such liability, rangers might consider 
a hiker’s wealth in deciding whether (or to what extent) they will 
provide her with costly services.141 The ex post disgorgement rule 
could be a better alternative: If the costs for hikers to take pre-
cautions are low, liability under this rule might be for a relatively 
low amount that the majority of hikers could afford to pay. As a 
result, the risk of the rangers’ discriminating in allocating their 
services diminishes. Suppose that a certain piece of equipment 
that costs $50 would help hikers not lose their way and that with-
out this equipment, their probability of getting lost and in need of 
rescue is 1 percent. In these circumstances, an ex post disgorge-
ment rule, whereby hikers pay 50 / 0.01= $5,000 for the rescue 
 
 141 The risk here might be less severe than the risk in other types of PGS. First, it 
would not always be possible for the rangers to know whether hikers are wealthy or poor. 
Second, when hikers’ lives are at stake, the risk of discrimination might be lower. See 
Part II.D.3. 
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efforts, could work well or at least better than a reimbursement 
of costs rule or ex post internalization rule. 
If many hikers cannot afford to pay the liability that an ex 
post disgorgement rule would yield, either of the ex ante rules 
could be applied. Liability for the expected social harm (PL), that 
is, ex ante internalization, and liability in an amount just slightly 
above the costs of precautions (B), that is, ex ante disgorgement 
($50 in Example 4), are typically both affordable for hikers and 
would eliminate the risk of discrimination. Ex ante internaliza-
tion would be equivalent to mandatory insurance, namely, hikers 
who fail to take care are liable for the expected social harm of 
their omission and are motivated to take efficient care from the 
outset to reduce this liability. However, the implementation of 
this rule also requires information, which might be hard to obtain. 
An ex ante disgorgement rule would require hikers to pay for the 
cost of (or slightly more than) the efficient precautions they did 
not take. The information about this cost is often easier to ac-
quire. Thus, under this rule, hikers would have optimal incen-
tives to take care.142 
As explained, both of the ex ante rules could mean high en-
forcement costs, as liability is imposed regardless of whether 
harm materializes. In Example 4, the ex ante rules mandate im-
posing liability on hikers who fail to invest $50 in the necessary 
equipment, irrespective of whether they actually get lost and need 
to be rescued. The ex ante rules would, therefore, be particularly 
suitable if the liability is easily enforced. In Example 4, this could 
be accomplished by charging higher park admission fees for hik-
ers who opt to go without the precautionary equipment. 
3. Environmental hazards. 
Legal regimes such as the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980143 (CERCLA), 
which render liable current and previous owners of contaminated 
properties, as well as other involved parties, considerably miti-
gate the risk of biased provision of pollution-neutralization ser-
vices by governmental agencies.144 Because it is likely that at least 
 
 142 Note that paying B, say, for the value of the unpurchased equipment, is not equiv-
alent to an obligation to purchase it as a precondition for permission to hike. 
 143 Pub L No 96-510, 94 Stat 2767, codified as amended at 42 USC § 9601 et seq. 
 144 CERCLA imposes liability on parties who fall into one of the following categories: 
(1) current owners and operators of the hazardous waste vessel or facility; (2) any person 
who owned or operated the vessel or facility at the time of the disposal; (3) any person who 
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one of the beneficiaries or the combination of several of them can 
pay the cleanup costs, the government has little at stake in how 
its pollution-neutralization efforts are allocated among polluters. 
Yet requiring polluters to reimburse the government only for 
its cleanup costs might be insufficient to induce them to take op-
timal care. Because the government may consequently avoid as-
sisting other polluters, those who benefited from the consumption 
of public resources should be liable for the harm incurred by those 
other polluters in being denied the pollution-neutralization ser-
vices. This is the result obtained under the ex post internalization 
rule. Assuming the government has the necessary information to 
apply the rule, polluters would be induced to take optimal care, 
and the government would be able to fully recover its costs when 
polluters are negligent. Alternatively, when information is lim-
ited, the ex post disgorgement rule could instead be applied to 
produce optimal care incentives. 
Not all environmental harms fall under the scope of CERCLA 
and similar legislation. When CERCLA does not apply, there can 
be a real risk of preferring deep-pocket defendants, which inten-
sifies as the government’s costs are higher. Governmental agen-
cies may prefer to direct their cleanup efforts to polluters that are 
likely to be able to pay compensation, while forcing other pollut-
ers to privately eliminate environmental hazards for which they 
are responsible. This, in turn, could induce deep-pocket defend-
ants to rely on publicly funded services and avoid efficiently in-
vesting in safety measures that would reduce or eliminate risks 
to the environment. 
Since the expected harm to third parties could be high, along 
with the costs of the untaken precautions, an ex post liability rule 
could lead to biased treatment by the government. This concern, 
as already noted, does not arise under either ex ante internaliza-
tion or ex ante disgorgement rules. Policymakers have in fact em-
ployed Pigouvian taxes in various environmental contexts.145 As 
our analysis shows, when a risk of discrimination exists, such 
taxes and similar ex ante incentives have significant advantages 
over the ex post liability and reimbursement of costs rules. 
 
generated the hazardous waste disposed of at the facility; and (4) any person who accepts 
or accepted to transport the hazardous substances. 42 USC § 9607(a). 
 145 See Masur and Posner, 164 U Pa L Rev at 104–08 (cited in note 120) (discussing 
the relatively extensive use of Pigouvian taxes in the environmental context). 
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4. Medical care and treatment. 
Hospitals are obligated by law to provide medical treatment 
to patients in need of urgent care. Under the 1986 Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act146 (EMTALA), hospitals 
must do so irrespective of patients’ ability to pay for their treat-
ment costs.147 Nevertheless, as noted, hospitals employ various 
tactics to limit the resources they spend on “uncovered” patients 
to reduce the financial burden of treating them.148 There are two 
possible sources from which a hospital can recoup patients’ treat-
ment costs. First, if a patient is insured, the hospital’s expenses 
are reimbursed by the insurer. Second, if an uninsured or under-
insured patient was harmed by a deep-pocket injurer, the hospital 
can claim compensation from the damages that the injurer will be 
required to pay the patient.149 
Our analysis suggests that liability regimes that induce hos-
pitals to favor patients harmed by deep-pocket injurers are objec-
tionable not only for violating EMTALA rules against discrimina-
tion in admitting and treating patients, but also for supplying 
deep-pocket injurers with an undesirable subsidy. Knowing that 
their victims are likely to be hospitalized and properly treated, 
deep-pocket injurers can avoid taking efficient precautions that 
would prevent the harm from occurring in the first place. When-
ever a hospital billing is lower than the cost of taking efficient 
precautions, an injurer’s savings from taking suboptimal care 
would more than offset reimbursing the hospital. Yet injurers’ low 
care levels result in harm to other patients as well, as this leads 
to a depletion of hospital resources: a bed occupied by a patient 
 
 146 Pub L No 99-272, 100 Stat 82, codified at 42 USC § 1395dd. 
 147 See generally 42 USC § 1395dd. For more information about EMTALA, see 
Melissa K. Stull, Construction and Application of Emergency Medical Treatment and Ac-
tive Labor Act, 104 ALR Fed 166 (1991). The law was enacted as part of the Comprehensive 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA) in response to a national epidemic 
of “patient dumping.” See Andrew Jay McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpreting the 
Federal Act Against Patient Dumping, 24 Wake Forest L Rev 173, 174–82 (1989); Henna 
K. Pithia, Patient Dumping: The Cobra That Never Struck, 24 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just 109, 
119–22 (2014). 
 148 See text accompanying note 94. 
 149 See text accompanying note 97. Even with regard to patients who have medical 
insurance, seeking recovery from their injurers enables hospitals to increase revenues. 
This is so as charging injurers allows hospitals “to collect their full, chargemaster rates 
rather than settle for insurer-contracted payments that represent a fraction of those 
prices.” Tara Bannow, Hospitals and Patients’ Attorneys Spar over Lien Practices (Modern 
Healthcare, May 25, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/5SFY-5HKU. 
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injured by a deep-pocket injurer means one less bed for other pa-
tients in need of medical treatment.150 
What liability rule would optimally incentivize all injurers? 
Unfortunately, none of the rules we have discussed here offer an 
efficient solution. Information as well as enforcement costs would 
often be prohibitively high under all four rules. Because injurers 
are heterogeneous (the precautions they fail to take vary in cost), 
it would be nearly impossible to apply either of the disgorgement 
rules. Similarly, because the social harm caused by injurers’ 
suboptimal care could vary greatly from case to case, both of the 
internalization rules are probably impractical. 
That is not to say, however, that the law is incapable of im-
proving injurers’ incentives in such situations. As we explained 
above,151 governmental entities prominently avoid discriminating 
in providing PGS when all potential beneficiaries are insured for 
reimbursement costs. In medical care cases, then, as the number 
of patients with healthcare insurance increases and treatment 
discrimination by hospitals becomes less likely, deep-pocket in-
jurers (knowing that hospitals no longer prefer their victims over 
other patients) will be incentivized to take efficient care. Thus, 
legislation like the 2010 Affordable Care Act152 (ACA), which 
makes healthcare insurance more broadly accessible, signifi-
cantly reduces the scope of the problem.153 
With regard to the amount that injurers should pay hospitals, 
given the obstacles to applying each of the four rules, a reimburse-
ment of costs rule seems optimal. First, as we have just explained, 
as the number of insured patients increases, the risk that deep-
pocket injurers will take suboptimal care drops. Accordingly, the 
main disadvantage of the rule is eliminated. Second, as opposed 
to the other three rules, enforcement and information costs under 
a reimbursement rule are low. Injurers pay only when victims are 
hospitalized, and the damages are in the amount of the actual 
hospitalization costs. 
 
 150 See Part II.A.2.c. 
 151 See text accompanying note 98. 
 152 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010), codified as amended in various sections of 
Title 42. 
 153 Studies show that following the recent healthcare reform, the percentage of unin-
sured adults decreased from 17.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2013 to 11 percent in the 
first quarter of 2016. See, for example, Stephanie Marken, U.S. Uninsured Rate at 11.0%, 
Lowest in Eight-Year Trend (Gallup, Apr 7, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/U94C 
-5M33. However, the percentage of uninsured adults has been creeping back up in recent 
years—to 13.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2018. See Dan Witters, U.S. Uninsured 
Rate Rises to Four-Year High (Gallup, Jan 23, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NXC8 
-XJPB. 
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5. Summary. 
Given the above analysis, we offer the following policy  
recommendations: 
1.  When the risk of discrimination is low and calculating 
the social harm is easy, an ex post internalization rule 
will result in optimal care incentives along with low 
enforcement costs. In cases in which the risk of 
discrimination is significant (and it often is), the other 
liability rules will be preferable. 
2.  When the cost of the relevant untaken precautions is low, 
ex post disgorgement is often the preferable rule. It 
eliminates, or at least greatly diminishes, the risk of 
discrimination and entails low enforcement costs. This 
rule is also most suitable when a lapse of attention is the 
source of the beneficiary’s faulty behavior. 
3.  When the cost of the untaken precautions is high, ex ante 
disgorgement is often the preferable rule. Information 
for applying this rule is usually readily available, and a 
risk of discriminatory provision of PGS does not arise. 
4.  When the costs of the untaken precautions run across a 
spectrum—some low and some high—both forms of 
disgorgement rules might be unfeasible, in which case ex 
ante internalization is often the optimal rule (with the 
exception of cases in which enforcement is prohibitively 
costly). 
5.  With respect to medical care and treatment cases, with 
the Affordable Care Act’s boost to the rate of healthcare 
insurance, the risk of biased treatment is diminishing, 
making the standard reimbursement of costs rule 
generally preferable given its low enforcement and 
information costs. 
As this summary suggests, in many cases, the choice boils 
down to one of two rules, either ex post disgorgement or ex ante 
disgorgement. The rule depends on whether the cost of the un-
taken precautions is low or high and whether the need for PGS 
has been triggered by a lapse of attention on the part of the ben-
eficiary. “Low” and “high” are, of course, relative terms, and leg-
islators could either explicitly define them (by setting rules) or 
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leave them to the courts’ and enforcers’ discretion (by setting 
standards).154 
CONCLUSION 
The current debate over compensating governmental entities 
and officials for losses incurred during the provision of PGS fo-
cuses on two alternatives: reimbursement of the costs incurred by 
the governmental entity and no liability at all. 
As we have demonstrated, in order to create optimal care in-
centives for PGS beneficiaries, they should be held liable for the 
full amount of harm caused by their negligent failure to take care, 
including harm to third parties. We have also explained that even 
liability for only reimbursement of costs creates a substantial risk 
that governmental entities will provide PGS in a discriminatory 
manner. Our tentative conclusion is that when this risk arises, no 
liability is better than liability from both efficiency and distribu-
tive justice perspectives. We also emphasized that in certain cir-
cumstances, discrimination is not a real concern and reimburse-
ment of costs is, therefore, generally better than no liability. 
However, as we have shown, four other liability rules could 
provide beneficiaries with efficient incentives to take care. These 
rules differ in their informational requirements and enforcement 
costs; they could either substantially reduce (ex post disgorge-
ment) or completely eliminate (ex ante internalization and ex 
ante disgorgement) any incentive for governmental PGS provid-
ers to discriminate among beneficiaries in allocating their ser-
vices. We suggest that lawmakers give these rules serious consid-
eration—in particular the ex post and ex ante disgorgement 
rules—for application in PGS cases in which preferential treat-
ment of a particular group of beneficiaries is a significant concern. 
More specifically, we recommend applying the ex ante disgorge-
ment rule in cases in which the costs of the precautions that bene-
ficiaries fail to take are high and the ex post disgorgement rule 
when the costs of untaken precautions are low or the failure to take 
precautions was due to a lapse of attention. For cases of urgent 
medical treatment, we conclude that the reimbursement of costs 
rule is most suitable because the risk of discrimination is becoming 
less and less acute and given that applying either of the internali-
zation and disgorgement rules requires costly information. 
 
 154 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
Duke L J 557 (1992) (comparing the benefits and costs of rules from standards in accessi-
bility and implementation). 
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Although we have focused on efficient prevention and mitiga-
tion of harm, our analysis applies to other contexts involving the 
provision of governmental assistance. Consider, for example, gov-
ernmental bailouts of financial institutions following an economic 
meltdown. Our analysis suggests that when the government can 
save only some of the numerous banks in need of a bailout, the 
social cost of saving one bank is not the nominal amount of the 
bailout, but rather the losses resulting from letting other banks 
that could benefit from a bailout become insolvent. In addition, 
obligating banks to reimburse the bailout costs could affect the 
government’s preference of certain banks to save, namely, those 
that are more likely to be able to pay back, or pay more quickly, 
these costs. However, predicting the government’s assistance, 
these banks might refrain from taking efficient measures (such 
as choosing other investment portfolios) that could allow them to 
survive the meltdown. Therefore, a no-reimbursement rule in 
such cases could increase, rather than decrease, social welfare. 
An even better alternative would be to apply either of the dis-
gorgement and internalization rules to optimally incentivize 
banks to take care. 
As this example implies, the discussion in this Article can 
serve as a general framework for analyzing the implications of 
putting a price tag on governmental services. While in many cases 
such a price tag is just and efficient, the socially optimal price 
may be higher (if collected ex post) or lower (if collected ex ante) 
than the government’s costs in providing these services. Further-
more, as we saw, in some instances, a price tag may do more harm 
than good. 
